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THE SOCIAL ENTERPRISE REVOLUTION IN 
CORPORATE LAW: A PRIMER ON EMERGING 
CORPORATE ENTITIES IN EUROPE AND THE 
UNITED STATES AND THE CASE FOR THE 
BENEFIT CORPORATION 
ROBERT T. ESPOSITO 
ABSTRACT 
Remarkably, in the face of a global recession, the social enterprise sector 
continued to experience extraordinary growth in both financial support and the 
number of newly authorized corporate entities aimed at social entrepreneurs 
who seek to use the power of business to simultaneously achieve profit and 
social or environmental benefits. This Article highlights recent developments in 
the social enterprise movement in Europe and the United States and focuses on 
the emergence of a surprisingly broad range of newly authorized corporate 
entities on both continents in response to the needs of social entrepreneurs. 
These include social cooperatives and the community interest company in 
Europe, as well as the L3C, the flexible purpose corporation, the social 
purpose corporation, and the benefit corporation in the United States. In so 
doing, this Article emphasizes the truly international scope of the social 
enterprise movement and explains the growing divergence in approaches to 
social enterprise between continental Europe and the United States. This 
Article suggests that the benefit corporation, which imposes a new duty to 
consider stakeholder interests, is currently the most effective vehicle through 
which social entrepreneurs can ensure their blended value goals are being 
considered and achieved. This Article concludes by responding to critiques of 
profit-distribution in social enterprise, making the case for the benefit 
corporation, and suggesting some statutory and tax reforms to further foster 
the social enterprise revolution. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I would leave this to the Consideration of all who are concern’d for 
their own or their Neighbor’s Temporal Happiness; and I am humbly of 
Opinion, that the Country is ripe for many such Friendly Societies, whereby 
every Man might help another, without any Disservice to himself.1 
An increasing number of voices are calling for a corporate revolution 
that promotes socially and environmentally responsible business practices, 
and in turn gives sustainable goods and services greater market access. 
Business luminaries like Muhammad Yunus,2 Bill Gates,3 and Richard 
Branson4 have voiced their frustrations with the predominance of share-
holder wealth maximization, and have joined the ranks of long-time sus-
tainability advocates like John Elkington5 in encouraging a new generation 
of entrepreneurs to consider stakeholder interests and embrace socially 
and environmentally responsible business models. In other words, they 
argue that doing good will be good for business.6 Moreover, they submit 
                                                 
1 Benjamin Franklin, Silence Dogood, No. 10, NEW-ENGLAND COURANT, Aug. 13, 
1722, at 1, reprinted in BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, SILENCE DOGOOD, THE BUSY-BODY, AND 
EARLY WRITINGS 32–33 (J.A. Leo Lemay ed., 2002). 
2 See MUHAMMAD YUNUS, BUILDING SOCIAL BUSINESS: THE NEW KIND OF CAPITALISM 
THAT SERVES HUMANITY’S MOST PRESSING NEEDS xv–xvi (2010). Yunus argues that our 
existing theory of capitalism is flawed insofar as it misrepresents human nature, and concludes 
that capitalism’s portrayal of human beings as “one-dimensional beings whose only mission is 
to maximize profit” represents a “badly distorted picture” because it fails to recognize that 
human beings are also driven by selfless motivations. Id. at xv. 
3 See Bill Gates, Remarks at the 2008 World Economic Forum: Creative Capitalism 
(Jan. 24, 2008) (transcript and video available at http://www.gatesfoundation.org/speech
es-commentary/Pages/bill-gates-2008-world-economic-forum-creative-capitalism.aspx). 
Gates submits that, in general, people benefit in inverse proportion to their need in a pure 
capitalist system and challenges his audience to find ways for businesses and govern-
ments to “create measures of what companies are doing to use their power and intelli-
gence to serve a wider circle of people.” Id. 
4 RICHARD BRANSON, SCREW BUSINESS AS USUAL 96 (2011) (“One of the more 
devastating theories of the 1970s was that no matter what it took to achieve it, the 
primary purpose of business was to maximize value for its shareholders. This principle 
has led to a variety of social ills where businesses discard employees (at the drop of a 
hat), pollute our air and waters, or create short-term gains that are unsustainable.”). 
5 John Elkington, co-founder of the international consultancy SustainAbility, is credited 
with coining terms like “triple-bottom line” and is recognized as a leading advocate for 
sustainable development. For more information, see generally Elkington’s website, 
JOHNELKINGTON.COM, http://www.johnelkington.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). See 
also JOHN ELKINGTON & PAMELA HARTIGAN, THE POWER OF UNREASONABLE PEOPLE: 
HOW SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS CREATE MARKETS THAT CHANGE THE WORLD 1–2 (2008). 
6 BRANSON, supra note 4, at 24–25. 
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that the recent global financial crisis has brought to bear the shortcomings 
of traditional corporate models, and provides an opportunity for serious 
reconsideration of corporate governance.7 Most importantly, they have a 
growing audience of young social entrepreneurs who want to harness the 
power of business to address social and environmental problems.8 
Recent data suggests that the market has begun to take these calls for 
change seriously; in fact, despite the worst financial crisis since the Great 
Depression, businesses engaged in socially and environmentally responsible 
enterprise now enjoy unprecedented financial support.9 According to a re-
cent report published by the U.S. Social Investment Forum (US-SIF), “as-
sets involved in sustainable and socially responsible investing increased 
more than 13 percent”10 from 2007 to 2010, while the broader universe of 
professionally managed assets remained stagnant.11 In 2007, 9.4% of total 
assets under professional management in the United States were involved in 
socially responsible investing.12 In the face of a recession, that figure in-
creased to 12.2%, or $3.07 trillion, by 2010.13 J.P. Morgan estimated that 
the ten-year profit potential from such investments ranges between $183 
                                                 
7 See YUNUS, supra note 2, at 29 (suggesting that the current financial crisis provides an 
opportunity for “bold experimentation”); see also Marjorie Kelly, Not Just for Profit, 54 
STRATEGY+BUSINESS, Feb. 26, 2009, at 4, http://www.strategy-business.com/media/file/e
news-02-26-09.pdf (arguing that the best way to avoid future collapses is to redesign cor-
porate ownership and governance); Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social 
Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337, 377 (2009) (opining that the current recession 
may give rise to “an open moment when Americans and their lawmakers may be willing to 
reconsider the theoretically rigid boundaries between the for-profit and nonprofit sectors”). 
See generally Engobo Emeseh et al., Corporations, CSR and Self Regulation: What Lessons 
from the Global Financial Crisis?, 11 GERMAN L. J. 230 (2010). 
8 David Gergen, The New Engines of Reform, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 20, 
2006, at 48 (identifying social enterprise as one of the “hottest movements” among young 
people in the United States); see also BRANSON, supra note 4, at 2 (“Just making money, 
in order simply to give it away, is out of date. There’s a massive generational shift oc-
curring that will blur the distinction between doing good and doing business.”). 
9 See Katharine V. Jackson, Towards a Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory of Corporate 
Governance: A Comparative Analysis, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 309, 327 (2011); Tom Zeller, 
Jr., Can Business Do the Job All by Itself?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes 
.com/2010/03/29/business/energy-environment/29green.html (socially responsible investing 
is growing more popular because U.S. institutional investors are increasingly recognizing 
that “doing good ... also enhance[s] shareholder value”). 
10 SOC. INV. FORUM FOUND., REPORT ON SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING TRENDS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 8 (2010), http://ussif.org/resources/research/documents/2010Trends
ES.pdf [hereinafter 2010 US-SIF REPORT]. 
11 Id. 
12 Alina Tugend, Picking Stocks That Don’t Sin, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2007, https://
www.nytimes.com/2007/03/17/business/17shortcuts.html?pagewanted=print. 
13 Id. 
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billion and $667 billion.14 The growth of social enterprise is now so pro-
nounced that in 2011, for the first time in its ninety-four-year history, 
Forbes Magazine released the “Impact 30,” a list of the world’s leading so-
cial entrepreneurs.15 
As a result, the legal frustrations of social entrepreneurs who seek to simul-
taneously pursue profits and social or environmental benefits have taken center 
stage. A 2007 poll showed that 71% of social entrepreneurs considered the 
choice of entity to be the single greatest challenge for their enterprise,16 reflect-
ing a general dissatisfaction with the for-profit/nonprofit dichotomy offered by 
traditional corporate law.17 These frustrations stem from the fact that for-profit 
entities are beholden to the overriding influence of profit-maximization at the 
expense of social or environmental goals, while nonprofits have charitable 
goals as their polestar, but are prohibited from distributing profits.18 This Ar-
ticle focuses on corporate law’s response in both Europe and the United 
States to this increasing demand for innovative corporate entities. In doing so, 
the author hopes to illustrate two main points: first, that social enterprise is a 
truly global movement; and second, that the newly authorized entities lie on a 
surprisingly broad spectrum of approaches to social enterprise. 
Some commentators have observed that corporate law does not for-
mally enslave all businesses to shareholder wealth maximization, but ra-
ther explicitly permits for-profit entities to make significant contributions 
to charity.19 Others have contended that the flexible approach desired by 
social entrepreneurs is made possible through constituency statutes,20 which 
                                                 
14 J.P. MORGAN GLOBAL RESEARCH, IMPACT INVESTMENTS: AN EMERGING ASSET CLASS 
6 (2010), http://www.jpmorgan.com/directdoc/impact_investments_nov2010.pdf; see also 
William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations Are Redefining the 
Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 822–23 (2012). 
15 Helen Coster, Forbes’ List of the Top 30 Social Entrepreneurs, FORBES (Nov. 30, 
2011, 11:48 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/helencoster/2011/11/30/forbes-list-of-the-top
-30-social-entrepreneurs/. 
16 ALLEN R. BROMBERGER, PERLMAN & PERLMAN LLP, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: A LAWYER’S 
PERSPECTIVE 2 (2008), available at http://www.perlmanandperlman.com/publications/arti
cles/2008/socialenterprise.pdf; see also Robert A. Katz & Antony Page, The Role of Social 
Enterprise, 35 VT. L. REV. 59, 85 (2010) [hereinafter Katz & Page, Role of Social Enterprise]. 
17 Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 
46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 591 (2011) (“Social entrepreneurs believe social good can 
be produced along with profits and desire hybrid forms of organization to smooth a single 
enterprise’s path to realizing both goals.”); see also Katz & Page, supra note 16, at 86–93; 
Kelley, supra note 7, at 339. 
18 See generally Kelley, supra note 7. 
19 Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 733, 763 (2005). 
20 Janet E. Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The Convenient Truth of How the 
Business Judgment Rule Protects a Board’s Decision to Engage in Social Entrepreneurship, 
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have been enacted in over thirty states.21 In theory these options appear ade-
quate, but in practice, they fall far short of addressing the needs of social entre-
preneurs. In reality, profit-maximization continues to dictate business decisions, 
and constituency statutes require no material change to business as usual.22 
On the other hand, social enterprise entities stand in stark contrast to cor-
porate law’s heretofore passive responses to the demands of social entre-
preneurs. These entities straddle the divide between for-profit and nonprofit 
and seek to blend the production of shareholder wealth with social and en-
vironmental goals under the umbrella of a single entity.23 In looking at re-
cently authorized entities in Europe and the United States, this Article finds 
considerable support for the contention that social enterprise is an interna-
tional movement.24 The thesis here is that while the social enterprise revo-
lution rages on in various sectors of the economy like energy, construction, 
and transportation, corporate law is on the precipice of a momentous sea-
change whose hallmark will be social enterprise entities that consider the 
interests of shareholders and stakeholders alike.25 
                                                                                                                         
29 CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 634 (2007); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting 
Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971, 973–74 (1992). 
21 John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of Having “Two Masters”: A Framework 
for L3C Fiduciary Duties and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117, 132–39 (2010). 
22 See id. at 134. 
23 See Kelley, supra note 7, at 340. In this sense, the author concurs with Kelley’s obser-
vation that we are witnessing the emergence of a “fourth sector” of our economy that 
encompasses elements of both business and nonprofit sectors. Id.; see also Heerad Sabeti, 
The For-Benefit Enterprise, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov. 2011, at 99–104 (“With formalization 
of the for-benefit structure, we will see the emergence of a fourth sector of the economy, 
interacting with but separate from governments, nonprofits, and for-profit businesses.”). 
24 Rosemary E. Fei, Beyond Taxation: A Guide to Social Enterprise Vehicles, 22 
TAXATION OF EXEMPTS, Jan.-Feb. 2011, at 13–14 (“More so than in many areas of law, social 
enterprise is international in practice. Different national legal regimes—themselves in 
different stages of development—have responded more or less quickly and in a variety of 
ways to the challenge of creating new legal constructs for operating activities that are not quite 
business as usual, nor charity as usual, nor even social change as usual.”); see also Alissa 
Mickels, Note, Beyond Corporate Social Responsibility: Reconciling the Ideals of a For-
Benefit Corporation with Director Fiduciary Duties in the U.S. and Europe, 32 HASTINGS 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 271, 292–94 (2009) (noting a global trend towards stakeholder-
centered corporate governance models). While this Article focuses on social enterprise in the 
United States and Europe, social enterprise is not limited to those continents. Some 
commentators have observed the beginnings of the social enterprise revolution in Asia. See, 
e.g., Rosario Laratta, The Emergence of the Social Enterprise Sector in Japan, 9 INT’L J. CIV. 
SOC’Y L. 35, 49 (2011); Rebecca Lee, The Emergence of Social Enterprises in China: The 
Quest for Space and Legitimacy, 2 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 79, 84–91 (2009). 
25 See Sabeti, supra note 23, at 99. 
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But what, exactly, is meant by “social enterprise?” Definitions range from 
simply “the use of market-based strategies to promote the public good”26 to 
complex factor-based analyses of an organization’s profit distribution and man-
agement structure.27 Professors Robert Katz and Antony Page adopt Paul 
Light’s definition, to wit: “an organization or venture that achieves its primary 
social or environmental mission using business methods, typically by operating 
a revenue-generating business.”28 In contrast, in 2002 the U.K. Department of 
Trade and Industry published Social Enterprise: A Strategy for Success, which 
defined social enterprise as “a business with primarily social objectives whose 
surpluses are principally reinvested for that purpose in the business or in the 
community, rather than being driven by the need to maximise profit for share-
holders and owners.”29 European commentator Jacques Defourny suggests 
several criteria to determine the existence of a social enterprise, including “[a] 
continuous activity producing goods and/or selling services,” “[a] high degree 
of autonomy,” “[a] minimum amount of paid work,” “[a]n explicit aim to bene-
fit the community,” “[a] participatory nature, which involves the various parties 
affected by the activity,” and “limited profit distribution.”30 
Despite the infancy of social enterprise, much ink has already been spilt 
attempting to define it. This Article submits that the distinction between Eu-
ropean social enterprise and American social enterprise prevents the crafting 
of an internationally acceptable definition. Most European jurisdictions 
view social enterprise as an alternative to traditional charities,31 while the 
                                                 
26 Briana Cummings, Note, Benefit Corporations: How to Enforce a Mandate to Promote 
the Public Interest, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 578 (2012); see also James J. Fishman, Wrong 
Way Corrigan and Recent Developments in the Nonprofit Landscape: A Need for New 
Legal Approaches, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 567, 598 (2007) (defining social enterprise as 
“for-profit vehicles committed to philanthropic activity”); Kyle Westaway, Something 
Republicans and Democrats Can Agree On: Social Entrepreneurship, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION 
REV. (Apr. 17, 2012), http://www.ssireview.org/blog/entry/something_republicans_and
_democrats_can_agree_on_social_entrepreneurship (defining social enterprise as “market-
based solutions to social and environmental problems”). 
27 See Jacques Defourny, Social Enterprise in an Enlarged Europe: Concept and Realities 
(1994), available at http://www.emes.net/fileadmin/emes/PDF_files/Articles/Defourny
/Defourny.Soc.ent.CEE.3.06.pdf (excerpt from conference paper). 
28 Katz & Page, supra note 16, at 59 (quoting PAUL C. LIGHT, THE SEARCH FOR SOCIAL 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 5 (2008)) (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted). 
29 DEP’T OF TRADE & INDUS., SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: A STRATEGY FOR SUCCESS 7 (2002), 
available at http://www.seeewiki.co.uk/~wiki/images/5/5a/SE_Strategy_for_success.pdf. 
30 Defourny, supra note 27, at 9–10. Defourny’s criteria represent an “ideal-type” of social 
enterprise, and are not conditions precedent to an entity qualifying as a social enterprise. He 
suggests that they should be used as “a tool, somewhat analogous to a compass, which can 
help the researchers locate the position of certain entities relative to one another.” Id. at 11. 
31 See Jacques Defourny & Marthe Nyssens, Social Enterprise in Europe: Recent Trends 
and Developments, 4 SOC. ENTERPRISE J. 202, 204 (2008). 
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United States has embraced a broader view of social enterprise as an emerg-
ing “fourth sector” of the economy, wherein profit maximization may be 
usurped by social or environmental goals.32 
In addition, other new and related terms such as “social business,” “social 
entrepreneurship,” “impact investing,” and “corporate social responsibility” 
are being used with increased frequency in business and legal literature and 
merit a brief review. “Social business” is a term coined by Muhammad 
Yunus, a renowned economist and the father of the microfinance industry.33 
According to Yunus, a social business is either a “non-loss, non-dividend 
company devoted to solving a social problem and owned by investors who 
reinvest all profits,”34 or “a profit-making company owned by poor people.”35 
For Yunus, the defining characteristic of social business is the prohibition on 
profit-distribution to wealthy investors.36 In this respect, social business rep-
resents a subcategory of social enterprise, which in many cases embraces 
profit distribution. “Social entrepreneurship,” in contrast, is a broader term 
generally referring to any venture that creates social or environmental bene-
fits.37 Such activities range from corporate social responsibility initiatives to 
double- or triple-bottom line investment techniques.38 “Impact investing,” a 
form of social entrepreneurship, is also known as “mission investing, respon-
sible investing, double or triple bottom line investing, ethical investing, 
sustainable investing, or green investing.”39 These terms are used inter-
changeably and refer in general to “an investment discipline that considers 
environmental, social and corporate governance criteria to generate long-term 
competitive financial returns and positive societal impact.”40 Impact investing 
is largely fueled by socially responsible investment funds.41 These institution-
al funds take into account nonfinancial and social benefit considerations when 
screening potential investment opportunities by either avoiding companies 
engaged in socially or environmentally harmful activities or actively seeking 
                                                 
32 Kelly, supra note 7, at 340. 
33 See generally YUNUS, supra note 2. 
34 Id. at 1. 
35 Id. at 2. 
36 Id. 
37 See id. at 4. 
38 See Defourny & Nyssens, supra note 31, at 203; Kelly, supra note 7, at 339. 
39 Sustainable and Responsible Investing Facts, US-SIF, http://ussif.org/resources/sri
guide/srifacts.cfm (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
40 2010 US-SIF REPORT, supra note 10, at 13; see also Sustainable and Responsible 
Investing Facts, supra note 39. 
41 See, e.g., Our Fund, GOOD CAPITAL, http://www.goodcap.net/ourfund.php (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2013). 
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companies engaged in positive pursuits.42 Finally, “corporate social responsi-
bility” (CSR) is a term that has largely defied definition but is loosely based 
around notions of voluntary corporate transparency.43 Some commentators 
have observed that CSR lacks any identifiable manifestation or consensus on 
regulatory enforcement,44 a shortcoming responsible for CSR’s failure to 
square voluntary corporate transparency with perceived ethical imperatives.45 
While many welcome CSR’s emphasis on corporate transparency, social en-
terprise and its accompanying emerging entities go much further than CSR’s 
malleable, voluntary approach.46 
Social enterprise advocates argue that their model of corporate govern-
ance will benefit society and the environment, and will also be good for busi-
ness.47 Early studies appear to confirm this assertion.48 Furthermore, as Pro-
fessors Katz and Page note, by creating a “fourth sector” of the economy, 
social enterprise largely sidesteps the longstanding debate regarding share-
holder wealth maximization by offering new entities with blended corporate 
purposes.49 Lastly, and most pragmatically, these entities have consistently 
received bipartisan political support.50 As Kyle Westaway, founder of the so-
cial enterprise boutique firm Westaway Law, explains: “Liberals love [social 
enterprise] because it proves that business can be socially and environmentally 
                                                 
42 Kelley, supra note 7, at 358. 
43 See JENNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: 
LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 30–31 (2006) (discussing 
multiple views of CSR and clarifying CSR as distinct from concepts of corporate gover-
nance); Larry Catá Backer, From Moral Obligation to International Law: Disclosure 
Systems, Markets and the Regulation of Multinational Corporations, 39 GEO. J. INT’L L. 
591, 617 (2008) [hereinafter Backer, Moral Obligation] (noting that there is no consensus 
on the definition and value of CSR); Jackson, supra note 9, at 325 n.112 (citing CSR 
EUROPE, A GUIDE TO CSR IN EUROPE: COUNTRY INSIGHTS BY CSR 2 (Oct. 2009)). 
44 Backer, supra note 43, at 617. 
45 See ZERK, supra note 43, at 30. 
46 See Kelly, supra note 7, at 350–51. 
47 See Kerr, supra note 20, at 634–35. 
48 BRANSON, supra note 4, at 25 (quoting a FTSE study finding that “companies that 
consistently manage and measure their responsible business activities outperformed their 
FTSE 350 peers on total shareholder return in seven out of the last eight years”); see also 
Kerr, supra note 20, at 634–35. 
49 See Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social Enterprise the New Corporate Social 
Responsibility?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351, 1353 (2011) [hereinafter Page & Katz, 
New Corporate Social Responsibility]. 
50 Kyle Westaway, New York Unanimously Passes Benefit Corporation Bill, SOCENTLAW 
(July 6, 2011), http://socentlaw.com/2011/07/new-york-unanimously-passes-benefit-cor
poration-bill (noting that a recent bill authorizing benefit corporations passed in the New 
York legislature by a 62-0 vote in the Senate and a 139-0 vote in the Assembly). 
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responsible. Conservatives love it because it offers the free market, not gov-
ernment, as the solution to social and environmental problems.”51 
The benefit corporation is one of the latest developments in the social 
enterprise revolution in corporate law. In 2011, benefit corporations statutes 
were enacted in five states52 and proposed legislation was introduced in four 
others.53 As of March 2013, benefit corporations are authorized in twelve 
states and the District of Columbia.54 Furthermore, 2011 also witnessed the 
introduction of two additional social enterprise entities—namely, the flexi-
ble purpose corporation (FPC) and the social purpose corporation (SPC).55 
This Article identifies a number of recently enacted entities in Europe and 
the United States and argues that the benefit corporation is currently the most 
effective in achieving the blended value goals of the social enterprise move-
ment.56 To that end, Part I provides a background on corporate responsibility 
and discusses the failure to effectively regulate the world’s largest corpora-
tions.57 Part II introduces the concept of social enterprise from a European 
perspective and highlights the differences between continental Europe’s so-
cial cooperatives and the U.K.’s Community Interest Company.58 Part III 
turns to social enterprise in the United States and identifies several emerging 
entities, including low-profit limited liability companies (L3Cs), flexible pur-
pose corporations, social purpose corporations, and benefit corporations.59 
                                                 
51 Id. 
52 CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14600–14631 (West 2012) (effective Jan. 1, 2012); HAW. REV. 
STAT. §§ 420D-1 to -13 (2012) (effective July 8, 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:18-1 to -11 
(West, Westlaw current through L.2012, c. 45 and J.R. No. 1) (effective Mar. 1, 2011); 
New York, N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1701–1709 (McKinney 2012) (effective Feb. 10, 
2012); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-782 to -791 (2012); see also Passing Legislation, B CORP., 
http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/legislation (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
53 S.B. 11-005, 68th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2011); S.B. 359, 96th Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Mich. 2011); S.B. 360, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2011); H.B. 4615, 96th Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Mich. 2011); H.B. 4616, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2011); S.B. 26, 2011-12 Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011); S.B. 433, 195th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2011); H.B. 1616, 
195th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2011); see also Passing Legislation, B CORP., supra note 52. 
54 California, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Louisiana, New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia have all enacted statutes authorizing 
benefit corporations. State by State Legislative Status, BENEFIT CORP INFO. CENTER, http://www. 
benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
55 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2502, et seq. (West 2012); S.H.B. 2239, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Wash. 2012). 
56 Kelly, supra note 7, at 10 (arguing that alternative corporate designs “are likely to 
prove better adapted to the cultural and ecological demands of the 21st century than the 
industrial age models they might one day replace”). 
57 See infra Part I. 
58 See infra Part II. 
59 See infra Part III. 
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Based on an analysis of emerging social enterprise corporate forms on both 
continents, Part IV concludes that the benefit corporation most successfully 
integrates the flexibility and accountability required for social enterprise’s 
blended value goals.60 Part IV also addresses some critiques of profit-
distribution in social enterprise and suggests possible reforms for future bene-
fit corporation legislation.61 
I. A REVIEW OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 
In the 1930s, Adolf Berle and E. Merrick Dodd pioneered the field of 
corporate governance scholarship; indeed, many find the genesis of the mod-
ern debate surrounding corporate responsibility in the 1931–1932 issues of 
the Harvard Law Review.62 Berle advanced a trustee model in which the cor-
poration’s directors acted as trustees of corporate property on behalf of the 
shareholder-beneficiaries.63 Berle’s trustee model is generally seen as the 
forefather of contractarian shareholder-primacy.64 On the other hand, Dodd 
argued that corporations were economic institutions, “which ha[d] a social 
service as well as a profit-making function.”65 In this sense, Dodd was the 
predecessor of progressive “communitarian” theories of corporate govern-
ance.66 However, as some commentators have observed, the legal debate has 
                                                 
60 See infra Part IV. 
61 See infra Part IV. 
62 Compare Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. 
REV. 1049, 1049 (1931), and Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are 
Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1365–66 (1932), with E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., 
For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1147–48 (1932). 
For a more thorough history of the debate, see generally Bainbridge, supra note 20; Page 
& Katz, New Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 49, at 1354–61. 
63 See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 7 (1932). 
64 Page & Katz, New Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 49, at 1356; see also 
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Essay, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 
GEO. L.J. 439, 444 n.6 (2001); Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 972 (“Berle contended that ... 
the board of directors should operate the corporation for the sole benefit of the sharehold-
ers.”); cf. Page & Katz, New Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 49, at 1357–58 
(emphasizing that Berle’s views evolved over time, and that by 1954, Berle had expressed a 
preference for a more communitarian model of corporate governance). 
65 Dodd, supra note 62, at 1148; see also Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 972–73 (“Dodd 
... saw shareholders as absentee owners whose interests can be subjugated to those of other 
corporate constituencies and those of society at large.”). 
66 In an attempt to broaden the legal literature beyond traditional neoclassical economic 
analysis, advocates of progressive corporate law adopted a multidisciplinary understanding 
of corporate law. See generally Joel Seligman, Foreword to PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 
ix (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995). In doing so, proponents of progressive corporate law 
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been spinning its wheels since the 1930s.67 Indeed, more than eight decades 
later, most commentators acknowledge the failure of the legal debate to re-
solve these competing interpretations of corporate responsibility.68 
While the legal debate remained relatively stagnant, multinational corpora-
tions69 (MNCs) continued to grow in size and influence.70 Indeed, MNCs now 
                                                                                                                         
challenged shareholder primacy. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, Working Toward a New Par-
adigm, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra, at 35, 36 (contending that “market 
theories define efficiency too narrowly and that efficiency cannot be separated from 
concepts of social justice and normative goals”); David Millon, Communitarianism in 
Corporate Law: Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE 
LAW, supra, at 1, 1 (“[Progressives] ha[ve] challenged corporate law’s traditional commit-
ment to the shareholder primacy principle ... [catalyzed by] concern about the harm to non-
shareholders that can occur as a result of managerial adherence to the shareholder primacy 
principle.”); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE 
LAW, supra, at 185, 187 (criticizing contractarian models of corporate governance as 
“necessarily limit[ing] the room available for trust,” which in turn encourages parties to act 
entirely out of self-interest and “ultimately damages the fabric of a community”). 
67 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Book Review, Community and Statism: A Conservative Con-
tractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 
902–03 (1997) (“In the 1930s, we had the Berle-Dodd debate. In the 1950s, Berle and 
others revisited the issue. In the 1970s, there was a major fracas over corporate social re-
sponsibility. Finally, today we have the nonshareholder constituency debate.... [E]ach iter-
ation adopts a new terminology, focuses on a slightly different facet of the problem, and de-
velops some new ideas. But, all-in-all, we have been here before.” (footnotes omitted)); see 
also Page & Katz, New Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 49, at 1360–61. 
68 See Lewis D. Solomon, On the Frontier of Capitalism: Implementation of Humanomics 
by Modern Publicly Held Corporations—A Critical Assessment, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE 
LAW, supra note 66, at 281 (“This controversy regarding corporate goals and stakeholder 
interests has spanned most of the twentieth century.”); Page & Katz, supra note 49, at 1361 
(“[A]lthough CSR may have good ideas about corporate behavior, it has generally failed to 
produce meaningful large-scale legal reform.”); C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate 
Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-first Century, 51 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 77, 78 (2002). But see Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder 
Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1190 (2002) (arguing that there has been “some intel-
lectual progress” in the area of corporate responsibility). 
69 The author acknowledges that the definition of the term “multinational” has evolved since 
it was coined by David E. Lilienthal in 1960. See PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISES & THE LAW 5 (2d ed. 2007) (quoting D.K. Fieldhouse, The Multinational: A 
Critique of a Concept, in MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 9, 10 
(Alice Teichova et al. eds., 1986)). For the purposes of this Article, the author adopts the 
OECD’s definition of “multinational,” which emphasizes the degree to which one entity 
exerts control and influence over other entities located in different jurisdictions. See id. at 
52–53; ZERK, supra note 43, at 51 (observing that most general-purpose definitions of 
multinational now emphasize relationships of control instead of ownership relationships 
between entities). 
70 See Gralf-Peter Calliess, Introduction: Transnational Corporations Revisited, 18 
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 601, 606 (2011). 
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have revenues that exceed the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of many devel-
oping countries, allowing them to exert considerable economic and political 
pressure on governments.71 Furthermore, as Peter Muchlinski observes, the 
recent trend in mature MNCs has been one towards heterarchy, not hierar-
chy, encouraging the geographic spread of functions across international 
borders.72 It is this increase in transnational and transjurisdictional opera-
tions,73 working in concert with a shareholder-centric model of corporate 
governance, which drives MNCs to exploit looser environmental and labor 
regulations in developing countries.74 
In response, the international community made attempts to regulate these 
organizations and hold them accountable for their negative social and environ-
mental outputs.75 Recent examples of these efforts fall under the umbrella of 
CSR,76 achieved through charity funds set aside by a for-profit corporation 
for good works in local communities,77 or through “community programs, 
or holistic decision making” that align with the corporation’s profit-making 
purpose.78 CSR advocates maintain that it presents an effective alternative 
                                                 
71 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 187–88 (2006); Issachar 
Rosen-Zvi, You Are Too Soft!: What Can Corporate Social Responsibility Do for Climate 
Change?, 12 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 527, 531–32 (2011); see also Gralf-Peter Calliess, 
supra note 70, at 613–14 (2011) (discussing Horst Eidenmuller’s observations that law 
protecting public interests is frequently circumvented by transnational corporations and 
Karsten Nowrot’s suggestion that transnational corporations be more deeply integrated 
within the international legal process); Dan Danielsen, How Corporations Govern: Taking 
Corporate Power Seriously in Transnational Regulation and Governance, 46 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 411, 412 (2005) (discussing the myriad of ways in which corporations engage in and 
exercise influence on governance); Issachar Rosen-Zvi, You Are Too Soft!: What Can 
Corporate Social Responsibility Do for Climate Change?, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 527, 
531–32 (2001). See generally Gralf-Peter Calliess & Jens Mertens, Transnational Cor-
porations, Global Competition Policy, and the Shortcomings of Private International Law, 
18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 843 (2011). 
72 MUCHLINSKI, supra note 69, at 45–49 (citing BP, General Electric, and IBM as 
examples of multinational enterprises that “have moved towards a more flexible and in-
novation driven structure”); see also CHRISTOPHER A. BARTLETT ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL 
MANAGEMENT: TEXT CASES AND READINGS IN CROSS-BORDER MANAGEMENT 774–813, 
(McGraw Hill Irwin Press, 4th ed. 2004). 
73 See generally ZERK, supra note 43. 
74 See Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next 
Level, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 389, 399–400 (2005). 
75 See generally ZERK, supra note 43 (identifying and analyzing several different reg-
ulatory approaches to multinational corporations). 
76 See Emesh et al., supra note 7, at 236–37 (defining CSR as an attempt “to expand the 
scope of corporate obligations beyond the traditional duty of care to their shareholders re-
cognized by the law but also to their workers and the community in which they operate”). 
77 YUNUS, supra note 2, at 9. 
78 Steven Munch, Note, Improving the Benefit Corporation: How Traditional Governance 
Mechanisms Can Enhance the Innovative New Business Form, 7 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 
170, 178 (2012). 
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to government regulation by encouraging more socially and environmental-
ly responsible approaches to corporate governance.79 Critics counter that 
CSR’s voluntary transparency is simply an attempt to preempt government 
regulation and protect a corporation’s brand image.80 This Part identifies sever-
al examples of CSR, including corporate responsibility reporting (CR report-
ing), corporate codes of conduct, and constituency statutes.81 Part I.A con-
cludes that MNCs remain largely unaccountable for their negative social or 
environmental outputs despite CSR’s various manifestations.82 
Next, Part I.B turns to existing regulation of MNCs.83 This Part con-
cludes that the combination of jurisdictional hurdles and weak regulatory 
tools results in a general inability to effectively regulate MNCs, and finds 
both CSR and existing regulatory tools insufficient for addressing corporate 
responsibility.84 While the kneejerk reaction for more regulation has been 
advanced by some commentators,85 this Article suggests that the hallmark 
of the social enterprise movement—the blended corporate purpose—has the 
potential to change the legal landscape of corporate responsibility. 
A. Corporate Responsibility 
1. Corporate Responsibility Reporting 
Corporate responsibility (CR) reporting is the increasingly widespread 
practice amongst MNCs of voluntarily reporting their environmental, social, 
and economic impacts.86 Indeed, nearly all of the world’s largest corporations 
                                                 
79 See Guy Mundlak & Issi Rosen-Zvi, Signaling Virtue? A Comparison of Corporate 
Codes in the Fields of Labor and Environment, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 603, 604 
(2011); Rosen-Zvi, supra note 71, at 537. 
80 Rosen-Zvi, supra note 71, at 539. 
81 The author acknowledges that socially and environmentally responsible shareholder 
proposals have also been another method pursued by CSR. See Ian B. Lee, Corporate 
Law, Profit Maximization, and the “Responsible” Shareholder, STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN., 
Spring 2005, at 31, 71–72 (discussing the sources of authority for socially responsible in-
vesting and supporting the existing availability of shareholder proxies for socially respon-
sible shareholder proposals). However, such shareholder proposals often obtain less than 
30% of the votes and are generally voted down. See 2010 US-SIF Report, supra note 10, at 
50 fig.4.6 (showing that in 2010, only 29% of social and environmental shareholder pro-
posals received greater than 30% support). For examples of such proposals related to 
climate change, see Perry E. Wallace, Climate Change, Fiduciary Duty, and Corporate 
Disclosure: Are Things Heating Up in the Boardroom?, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 293, 322 (2008). 
82 See infra Part I.A.4. 
83 See infra Part I.B. 
84 See infra Part I.C. 
85 See Emesh et al., supra note 7, at 253–54. 
86 Adam Sulkowski & Steven White, Financial Performance, Pollution Measures and 
the Propensity to Use Corporate Responsibility Reporting: Implications for Business and 
Legal Scholarship, 21 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 491, 492 (2010). 
654 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:639 
now issue CR reports. KPMG’s latest triennial survey of CR reporting shows 
that, as of 2011, 95% of the Global Fortune 250 (G250) companies engage in 
some form of CR reporting, up from 81% in 2008.87 The 2011 KPMG survey 
also reported that the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) standards are used by 
80% of G250 companies engaged in CR reporting.88 
At first glance, these statistics seem to suggest that CR reporting has 
been a great success. Indeed, to the extent CSR aims to require CR reports, 
it has succeeded. However, critics emphasize that despite its near-universal 
practice, CR reporting remains voluntary and without any binding legal obli-
gations.89 Moreover, CR reports are unaudited and fail to require any stand-
ardized methodology,90 calling into question the accuracy of self-reported 
data.91 Critics contend that the malleable nature of CR reporting favors corpo-
rations, who are free to skew or omit data regarding negative social or envi-
ronmental outputs.92 
In addition, recent data suggests that executives increasingly view CR re-
porting as a public relations tool rather than a vehicle for increased transpar-
ency or consideration of stakeholder interests.93 KPMG’s 2011 survey in-
cludes polling results from executives of G250 corporations regarding the 
perceived drivers underlying CR reporting.94 KPMG’s 2008 survey indicated 
that executives’ prime motivators were ethical and economic considera-
tions.95 However, in the wake of the recession, the leading motivator behind 
CR reporting shifted to concern for the corporation’s reputation and brand 
image.96 This rise of brand image as the single greatest driver of CR reporting 
                                                 
87 KPMG, INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING 2011, at 
6–7 (2011), http://www.kpmg.com/PT/pt/IssuesAndInsights/Documents/corporate-respons 
ibility2011.pdf [hereinafter 2011 KPMG SURVEY]; see also Sulkowski & White, supra note 
86, at 494 (identifying and analyzing data from KPMG’s 2008 International Survey). 
88 2011 KPMG SURVEY, supra note 87, at 20–21; see also Sulkowski & White, supra 
note 86, at 494. 
89 See Rosen-Zvi, supra note 71, at 531–34. See generally ZERK, supra note 43. 
90 See Rosen-Zvi, supra note 71, at 543–44; Jackson, supra note 9, at 389–90. 
91 See Rosen-Zvi, supra note 71, at 543–44; Jackson, supra note 9, at 389–90. 
92 See 2011 KPMG SURVEY, supra note 87, at 26 (“Unlike financial reporting, the 
disclosure of sustainability metrics to the market is largely unregulated.”); Jackson, supra 
note 9, at 389. 
93 See 2011 KPMG SURVEY, supra note 87, at 18–19. 
94 Id. at 19. 
95 KPMG, INTERNATIONAL SURVEY ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING 2008, 
at 18 (2008), available at http://www.kpmg.com/global/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublica
tions/pages/sustainability-corporate-responsibility-reporting-2008.aspx; see also Sulkowski 
& White, supra note 86, at 496–98, 498 n.41. 
96 2011 KPMG SURVEY, supra note 87, at 18–19 (reporting that the number one motiva-
tor behind CR reporting was “reputation/brand” with 67%; “ethical considerations” trailed 
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today raises the specter of “greenwashing” and appears to justify the healthy 
skepticism regarding the accuracy and comprehensiveness of these reports.97 
Furthermore, critics emphasize that CR reporting fails to involve board 
members in the process. Indeed, a majority of G250 directors have no direct 
involvement with CR reports, resulting in a failure to embed CSR’s social 
and environmental goals in the highest levels of the corporate decision-
making process.98 Additionally, CR reports are seldom issued in conjunction 
with, or included in, a corporation’s annual financial report.99 This practice 
reflects a purposeful attempt to avoid government oversight of CR reports, 
as explained by consultants at KPMG: 
The current practice of a separate CSR report (regardless of the medium 
used) from the annual report leaves freedom in reporting in terms of the 
associated legal risks. An annual report comes with specific reporting re-
quirements, external oversight and legal accountability towards parties 
with a financial interest in the company. Therefore, if integrated reporting 
is approached as integrating CSR information (and other business-im-
pacting information) into the annual report, additional legal risks can ap-
pear that you would rather avoid.100 
Moreover, critics argue that CR reporting does not ensure any standard-
ized methodology, which leads to inaccurate results. In conducting an empiri-
cal study on thirty MNC’s CR reports to assess their effectiveness regarding 
efforts to combat climate change, Issachar Rosen-Zvi highlights how variances 
in methodology allow major energy companies to effectively hide significant 
greenhouse gas emissions,101 and permit major automobile manufacturers to 
choose the most favorable baseline years from which their greenhouse gas 
emissions are measured.102 Additionally, many CR reporting standards against 
                                                                                                                         
significantly behind at number two with 58%, and “economic considerations” dropped off 
significantly to just 32%). 
97 See ZERK, supra note 43, at 100–01 (“Some multinationals have seen their environ-
mental initiatives dismissed as ‘greenwash’, while others have been accused of using CSR-
related initiatives as a way of diverting attention away from bad press elsewhere or as a tactical 
concession to avoid more stringent legislation at some later stage.” (footnotes omitted)). 
98 2011 KPMG SURVEY, supra note 87, at 27 (“[N]early half of the reporting companies 
either do not disclose—or possibly do not have—board member responsibility or involvement, 
which would be a key condition to embedding CR reporting into an organization.”). 
99 KPMG, INTEGRATED REPORTING: CLOSING THE LOOP OF STRATEGY 3 (April 2010) 
[hereinafter INTEGRATED REPORTING], http://www.kpmg.com/GR/en/IssuesAndInsights
/ArticlesPublications/Sustainability/Documents/Sustainable-insight-April-2010.pdf; see also 
2011 KPMG SURVEY, supra note 87, at 23 (indicating that only 27% of the G250 corpora-
tions include some form of CR reporting in their annual report). 
100 INTEGRATED REPORTING, supra note 99, at 8. 
101 Rosen-Zvi, supra note 71, at 543–48. 
102 Id. at 548–52. 
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which MNCs measure their practices, such as the GRI Guidelines, the Amer-
ican Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) standards, the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) 14000 International Environmental 
Standards, and the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies 
(CERES) Principles, fail to provide any mathematical formula or valuation 
metric for a corporation’s social and environmental benefits.103 
In sum, CR reporting is increasingly recognized for what it is—a public 
relations tool that pays lip service to increased corporate transparency but 
does little, if anything, to alter the corporate decision-making process.104 
2. Corporate Codes of Conduct 
Modern corporate codes of conduct are not a recent development and 
are now common in many jurisdictions.105 In theory, codes serve to “en-
hance corporations’ social and environmental commitments by articulating 
the norms and standards by which they profess to be bound.”106 Like CR 
reporting, most corporate codes of conduct are voluntary.107 However, the 
current voluntary promulgation and adherence to codes of conduct belies 
the original intent of modern codes.108 Indeed, codes promulgated in the 
1970s had a distinctly international flavor and were originally devised as 
third party regulatory tools for international organizations (IOs).109 To that 
end, IOs like the United Nations (UN),110 the Organization for Economic 
                                                 
103 But see Allison M. Snyder, Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable: Is Non-
Financial Disclosure the Answer?, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 565, 593 (2007) (noting that, 
in contrast to GRI and other popular CR reporting standards, the CSI Social Footprint does 
provide mathematical valuation for a corporation’s social and environmental benefits). 
104 Snyder, supra note 103, at 605 (“Empirical evidence illustrates that corporations do, in 
fact, use reports as a form of public relations and often fail to take social concerns seriously.”). 
105 See generally Index of Codes, EUR. CORP. GOVERNANCE INST., http://www.ecgi.org
/codes/all_codes.php (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (providing links to corporate codes of 
conduct in over 80 jurisdictions). 
106 Rosen-Zvi, supra note 71, at 537; see also Ans Kolk & Rob van Tulder, Setting New 
Global Rules? TNCs and Codes of Conduct, 14 TRANSNAT’L CORPS. 1, 3–4 (2005) (arguing 
that companies may also develop codes for the purpose of influencing other societal actors). 
107 Rosen-Zvi, supra note 71, at 537. 
108 For a more thorough historical analysis of corporate codes of conduct, see Mark B. 
Baker, Promises and Platitudes: Toward a New 21st Century Paradigm for Corporate 
Codes of Conduct?, 23 CONN. J. INT’L L. 123, 125–29 (2007). 
109 See id. at 126–27, 129. 
110 The UN Commission on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) was charged with 
drafting a code of conduct for transnational corporations in 1976. Background and Act-
ivities of the Commission and the Centre on Transnational Corporations, UNITED NATIONS 
CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., http://unctc.unctad.org/aspx/UNCTC%20from%201976
%20to%201979.aspx (last updated June 13, 2003). 
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Co-operation and Development (OECD),111 and the International Labor Or-
ganization (ILO)112 promulgated mandatory codes of conduct for multina-
tionals. Efforts at enforcement, however, proved largely unsuccessful. Pro-
fessor José Alvarez argues that the Reagan Administration, concerned over 
the potential impact of the “The New Regulatory Order”113 on U.S. corpora-
tions, joined with business interests to defeat efforts to promulgate enforce-
able codes of conduct, or to shift negotiations to more favorable fora.114 
This approach proved successful. The UNCTC’s efforts were abandoned in 
1993 after fourteen years of unsuccessful negotiations.115 Both the OECD’s 
Declaration and the ILO’s Tripartite Declaration survive, but they remain 
voluntary and “toothless”116 soft law.117 At most, these declarations are 
“part of an important inter-organizational dialogue concerning the legal re-
sponsibilities of multinational corporations[,]”118 but they fail to effect any 
                                                 
111 The governments of OECD Member Countries adopted the Declaration on International 
Investment and Multinational Enterprises on June 21, 1976. See ORGANISATION FOR ECON. 
CO-OPERATION & DEV., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 
15–22 (1984). As of May 2011, all thirty-four OECD Members, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
and seven other non-OECD countries have adopted the Declaration. OECD Declaration on 
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, OECD (May 25, 2011), http://
www.oecd.org/daf/internationalinvestment/investmentpolicy/oecddeclarationoninternation
alinvestmentandmultinationalenterprises.htm. 
112 INT’L LABOR ORG., TRIPARTITE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES CONCERNING 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND SOCIAL POLICY (Nov. 16, 1977), reprinted in 17 
I.L.M. 422, 423 (1978). 
113 JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 255 (Oxford 
Univ. Press, 2005) (citing Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Foreword to INTERNATIONAL REGULATION: 
NEW RULES IN A CHANGING WORLD ORDER (Carol C. Adelman ed., 1988)). 
114 Id. 
115 See UNCTC Evolution, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., http://
unctc.unctad.org/aspx/UNCTCEvolution.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (describing the 
1993 dissolution of the UNCTC and the transfer to the UNCTAD). In 2003, the UN 
promulgated the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12
/Rev.2 (Aug. 13, 2003), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/links/norms-
Aug2003.html [hereinafter UN Norms]. Like its predecessor, the UN Norms were aban-
doned and replaced with the voluntary Global Compact Project. See Overview of the UN 
Global Compact, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org
/AboutTheGC/ (last updated Dec. 1, 2011); John H. Knox, The Human Rights Council 
Endorses “Guiding Principles” for Corporations, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW (Aug. 1, 2011), 
http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/insight110801.pdf. 
116 ALVAREZ, supra note 113, at 256. 
117 Id. at 230 (noting that the ILO’s decision to promulgate these principles as a Declaration 
“suggests the intent to render this a truly ‘soft’ form of soft law [and] presumably reflects ... 
emphasis on affecting the conduct of private entities within states”). 
118 Id. 
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substantive changes in and of themselves. At the international level, chances 
of establishing enforceable codes of conduct on MNCs appear very low. 
At the domestic level, some legislators attempted to pick up this torch 
by proposing legislation that would require MNCs to adopt corporate 
codes of conduct. However, these bills all died silent deaths in committee. 
In the United States, former Rep. Cynthia McKinney (D-GA), along with 
thirty-two cosponsors, introduced the Corporate Code of Conduct Act 
(CCCA) in June of 2000.119 The CCCA would require any U.S. corpora-
tion employing “more than 20 persons in a foreign country, either directly 
or through subsidiaries[,] ... [to] take the necessary steps to implement [a] 
Corporate Code of Conduct.”120 The CCCA was tabled,121 reintroduced on 
May 11, 2006 as H.R. 5377,122 and was tabled again by the House Finan-
cial Services Committee.123 Comparable legislation introduced in Austral-
ia124 and the European Parliament125 suffered similar fates. 
For the moment, it appears that business interests have succeeded in 
stifling both international and domestic attempts to mandate enforceable 
corporate codes of conduct. The consistent failures to legislate in this area 
underscore the lack of political will necessary to pass codes with effective 
government enforcement and regulatory mechanisms on MNCs. 
As a result, corporate codes of conduct have become increasingly indi-
vidualistic,126 vesting MNCs with broad discretion in drafting and enforce-
ment. MNCs are free to choose whether to author codes independently or 
with stakeholder representatives, and whether to adopt unilateral codes, 
codes promulgated by industry groups, or model codes promulgated by 
international organizations or trade unions.127 Mark Baker argues that these 
options offer the benefit of flexibility, but that the resulting codes are flawed 
insofar as they: (i) fail to contain any specific content requirement;128 (ii) do 
                                                 
119 Baker, supra note 108, at 155–56. 
120 Id. at 156–57. 
121 Id. at 156. 
122 H.R. 5377, 109th Cong. (2006). 
123 See H.R. 5377 (109th): Corporate Code of Conduct Act, GOVTRACK.US, http://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/hr5377 (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). No further action 
has been taken by Congress. 
124 ZERK, supra note 43, at 165–66 (noting that the Australian Code of Conduct Bill 
was not recommended by the Statutory Committee). 
125 Id. at 170 (noting that the European Parliament’s Resolution on a Voluntary Code 
of Conduct for European Enterprises Operating in Developing Countries was never for-
mally implemented). 
126 See Baker, supra note 108, at 129. 
127 Rosen-Zvi, supra note 71, at 538. 
128 Baker, supra note 108, at 131. 
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not ensure they will be taken seriously by either managers or employees;129 
(iii) “do not contain adequate monitoring and enforcement procedures to en-
sure compliance[;]”130 and (iv) are largely confined to corporations dealing in 
consumer goods.131 Moreover, due to the lack of content requirements and 
standardized methodologies for measuring social and environmental perfor-
mance, observers have found it increasingly difficult to compare and contrast 
one MNC’s social or environmental benefits with those of another.132 
Even where codes of conduct and internal monitoring mechanisms are in 
place, there is no guarantee they will effect any substantive changes in business 
operations.133 Consider Nike, for example.134 Allison M. Snyder points to a 
recent study of 800 Nike factories in fifty-one different countries that assessed 
the effectiveness of codes of conduct in improving working conditions.135 The 
study concluded that despite Nike’s efforts, internal monitoring for code com-
pliance alone did not improve its suppliers’ working conditions.136 
In sum, while the adoption of codes of conduct should be commended 
insofar as they acknowledge the negative social and environmental external-
ities produced by MNCs, it appears these codes maintain the involuntary, 
malleable, and legally unenforceable qualities of the aforementioned CR 
reports. As several commentators conclude, “the grim fact remains that 
[MNCs] owe no legal obligations to anyone when they fail to abide with 
particular provisions of such Codes, or choose to extricate themselves total-
ly from its provisions.”137 
                                                 
129 Id. at 132. 
130 Id. at 133; see also 2011 KPMG SURVEY, supra note 87, at 26 (“Unlike financial 
reporting, the disclosure of sustainability metrics to the market is largely unregulated.”); 
ZERK, supra note 43, at 164 (noting that there is no effective way of ensuring compliance 
with voluntary codes of conduct). 
131 Baker, supra note 108, at 134. 
132 See Rosen-Zvi, supra note 71, at 538–39 (opting to rely on hard numbers provided 
by corporations regarding their environmental emissions, rather than “the softer public 
relations statements they make” in their CSRs). 
133 See Richard M. Locke et al., Does Monitoring Improve Labor Standards?: Lessons 
from Nike, 61 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 8–9, 20–21 (2007). 
134 Id. 
135 Snyder, supra note 103, at 595–96 (citing Locke et al., supra 133, at 20). 
136 Locke et al., supra note 133, at 20–21; cf. Larry Catá Backer, Multinational Cor-
porations as Objects and Sources of Transnational Regulation, 14 ILSA J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 499, 518 (2008) [hereinafter Backer, Multinational Corporations] (describing 
how Gap, Inc.’s 2005 Code of Vendor Conduct permitted Gap to “effectively assess civil 
penalties, impose training or other rehabilitation programs, compel changes in internal 
organization or terminate the contractual relationship with the enterprises subject to its 
standards”). 
137 Emeseh et al., supra note 7, at 258; see also ZERK, supra note 43, at 161 (discussing 
the fact that codes of conduct generally do not provide for the imposition of legal sanctions). 
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3. Constituency Statutes 
Yet another example of CSR’s efforts to enhance transparency and pro-
mote consideration of stakeholder interests is the constituency statute.138 Sev-
eral commentators characterize constituency statutes as legislative responses 
to the frenzy of hostile corporate takeovers of the 1980s.139 In 1983, Pennsyl-
vania became the first of about thirty states to enact constituency statutes.140 
In general, “[t]hese statutes explicitly permit directors to consider the effects 
of their decisions on a variety of nonshareholder interests[,]”141 including the 
long- and short-term effects of their decisions on constituency groups such as 
suppliers, employees, creditors, local communities, and customers.142 While 
most lawmakers likely had change-of-control decisions in mind when enact-
ing constituency statutes, CSR proponents observe that the application of 
constituency statutes is not necessarily limited to situations in which the 
corporation is for sale,143 and argue that such statutes attract socially re-
sponsible businesses, which, in turn, foster innovation and competition.144 
Thus, on paper, constituency statutes are applicable to any business deci-
sion, and have potentially far-reaching effects on corporate governance and 
decision-making. 
However, in all but three states, constituency statutes are written in per-
missive language.145 Critics emphasize that most constituency statutes permit 
directors to consider stakeholder interests, but “do not force a corporation to 
conduct itself in a socially responsible manner.”146 Permissive constituency 
                                                 
138 Gary von Stange, Note, Corporate Social Responsibility Through Constituency Statutes: 
Legend or Lie?, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 461, 479–81 (1994). 
139 See Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 973 (“In the wake of the 1980s’ merger mania, the 
corporate social responsibility debate resurfaced [as constituency statutes].”); Anthony Bisconti, 
Note, The Double Bottom Line: Can Constituency Statutes Protect Socially Responsible 
Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 780–81 (2009); Gary von 
Stange, supra note 138, at 467–69 (portraying constituency statutes as a reaction to “the 
feeding frenzy atmosphere of numerous hostile takeovers” in the 1980s). 
140 Gary von Stange, supra note 138, at 479. As of 2012, thirty-three states have enacted 
some form of constituency statute. See Clark & Babson, supra note 14, at 830, 830 n.64. 
141 Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 973; see also Kerr, supra note 20, at 634. 
142 Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 986. 
143 See Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 986; Clark & Babson, supra note 14, at 829 (“With 
the increase of mission-driven and triple-bottom-line corporations, these constituency 
statutes are now being analyzed outside the context of a hostile takeover.”); Eric W. Orts, 
Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 14, 30–31 (1992). 
144 Bisconti, supra note 139, at 786. 
145 Gary von Stange, supra note 138, at 480–81 (noting that only Arizona, Idaho, and 
Connecticut have enacted constituency statutes that are mandatory). 
146 Id. at 483; see also Fei, supra note 24, at 41. 
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statutes also fail to require transparency on social and environmental per-
formance.147 Professor Bainbridge concludes that constituency statutes “are 
frustratingly silent on many key issues,”148 lack any substantive or proce-
dural standards, and offer “surprisingly little guidance”149 to both board 
members and courts. Other critics observe the dearth of case law interpret-
ing constituency statutes150 and conclude that the statutes “function only to 
the extent that they do not conflict with shareholder primacy.”151 
From the perspective of judicial review, constituency statutes appear to 
hold some promise in the context of day-to-day decisions or defensive de-
cisions, where courts will generally apply the business judgment rule and 
give deference to the board’s decision.152 However, the impotence of con-
stituency statutes is most evident in the context of a change-of-control de-
cision, which triggers the so-called Revlon153 duty to maximize sharehold-
er wealth.154 The Revlon rule of shareholder primacy dealt a significant 
blow to proponents of constituency statutes insofar as it essentially nulli-
fied constituency statutes with respect to the most crucial of all business 
decisions—the sale of the corporation.155 Moreover, subsequent case law 
regarding constituency statutes appears to follow the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s approach. For example, in Baron v. Strawbridge & Clothier156 a 
Pennsylvania district court applied the Revlon duty in the context of a single-
party takeover attempt.157 
                                                 
147 Fei, supra note 24, at 41. 
148 Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 988. 
149 Id. at 974. 
150 Bisconti, supra note 139, at 784. 
151 Id. 
152 For a more thorough analysis of the three different levels of scrutiny courts will apply 
in evaluating business decisions, see Clark & Babson, supra note 14, at 834–36; Felicia R. 
Resor, Comment, Benefit Corporation Legislation, 12 WYO. L. REV. 91, 96–97 (2012). 
153 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986). 
154 The Revlon case involved a change-of-control situation wherein competing parties 
engaged in several rounds of bidding. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 177–79; see also Bainbridge, supra 
note 20, at 982. The Delaware Supreme Court held that once the directors decided to sell the 
company, their sole responsibility was to maximize shareholder value, or, in the words of the 
court, to become “auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders,” thus 
precluding any consideration of stakeholder interests. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. 
155 Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 982–84 (noting that Revlon “sharply limits” consideration 
by directors of stakeholder interests, and “puts considerable teeth into the” shareholder-centric 
theory of corporate governance); see also Bisconti, supra note 139, at 784, 786–88 (observing 
that “[c]onstituency statutes are essentially rendered impotent in [the Revlon] scenario”). 
156 Baron, 646 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Pa. 1986). 
157 See id. at 697 (attributing to corporate directors in Pennsylvania a duty to act in the 
best interests of shareholders); Bisconti, supra note 139, at 788–89 (arguing that the court 
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Some critics have gone so far as to suggest that constituency statutes are 
harmful in an “unscrupulous director” scenario.158 In authorizing directors to 
consider stakeholder interests, Professor Bainbridge argues that they also 
serve as a shield for unscrupulous directors to consider their own interests.159 
As Gary von Stange notes, this risks vesting “more unbridled power in the 
hands of management.”160 
4. Conclusion 
As this review has shown, CSR’s attempts to increase transparency and 
integrate consideration of stakeholder interests into corporate decision-making 
have not succeeded. CR reporting, corporate codes of conduct, and constit-
uency statutes have largely failed to affect any observable changes in busi-
ness as usual.161 The unaudited, unenforceable, and voluntary nature of CR 
reports and corporate codes of conduct render them ineffective approaches 
to enhancing corporations’ social and environmental commitments. Permis-
sive constituency statutes have likewise failed to bring about any significant 
change. While they grant directors broad discretion to consider stakeholder 
interests in day-to-day decisions and defensive decisions, their voluntary 
language leaves stakeholders to “rely upon the goodwill of the board.”162 
Moreover, in light of the Revlon duty to maximize shareholder value, con-
stituency statutes have been rendered meaningless in the context of change-
of-control decisions and do not cover the recurring public benefit actions 
social entrepreneurs seek to engage in.163 With the shortcomings of CSR in 
mind, this Article next turns to existing tools for regulating MNCs. 
B. Regulation of Multinational Corporations 
“It is a longstanding principle of American law ‘that legislation of Con-
gress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the 
                                                                                                                         
focused on protecting or benefiting shareholders to avoid determining how much weight 
should be given to constituency statutes). 
158 Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 1025; see also Gary von Stange, supra note 138, at 
488–89 (arguing that corporate managers may actually have encouraged adoption of con-
stituency statutes to protect their own interests by enlarging their discretionary powers). 
159 Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 1025. 
160 Gary von Stange, supra note 138, at 489. 
161 Page & Katz, New Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 49, at 1360–61 (“But 
despite decades of commentary and scholarship, the legal debate has failed to advance CSR in 
any significant way ... although CSR may have good ideas about corporate behavior, it has 
generally failed to produce meaningful large-scale legal reform.” (footnotes omitted)). 
162 Jackson, supra note 9, at 347. 
163 Munch, supra note 78, at 178–79. 
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territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’”164 As a result, unless Congress 
explicitly intends otherwise, courts will presume a statute is “primarily con-
cerned with domestic conditions.”165 This traditional presumption against ex-
traterritorial application of domestic law rests on the assumption that the sub-
jects and objects of regulation share common jurisdictional identities.166 
However, the simultaneous spread of globalization and investment treaties 
has undermined this assumption with respect to MNCs.167 
As a result, MNCs are able to avoid effective regulation in developed 
states by moving operations to developing states where their power and in-
fluence effectively “substitute themselves as new regulators of behavior.”168 
Thus, while domestic statutes provide an avenue for domestic regulation,169 
there is no corollary on the international level. As Jennifer Zerk explains, ob-
taining territorial jurisdiction over MNCs’ negative social and environmental 
externalities presents a significant obstacle for potential plaintiffs.170 With 
this jurisdictional hurdle as a backdrop, this Part turns to two main aspects 
of the legal landscape with respect to regulation of MNCs—namely, disclo-
sure requirements and private enforcement. 
1. Disclosure Requirements 
In the United States, all publicly-traded companies are subject to the 
Securities Exchange Commission’s (SEC) disclosure requirements.171 SEC 
regulation S-K provides the framework for annual and quarterly disclosure 
                                                 
164 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley Bros. v. 
Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949), as cited in Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 
2869, 2877 (2010)). 
165 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (quoting Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248). 
166 See Larry Catá Backer, Private Actors and Public Governance Beyond the State: The 
Multinational Corporation, the Financial Stability Board, and the Global Governance Order, 
18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 751, 754 (2011) [hereinafter Backer, Private Actors]. 
167 See Backer, Multinational Corporations, supra note 136, at 504; Backer, Private Ac-
tors, supra note 166, at 754 (discussing the effects of globalization). 
168 Backer, Private Actors, supra note 166, at 754; see also Backer, Multinational Cor-
porations, supra note 136, at 503–04 (explaining that while states’ regulatory powers often 
“extend no further than their political borders,” mutlinationals “tend to operate across 
political borders – to move assets, operations and activities in ways in which political bor-
ders become incidental to their activities”). 
169 See Backer, Multinational Corporations, supra note 136, at 503 (noting that while the 
interaction of traditional frameworks has been effective in regulating domestic entities, “it has 
proven to be less useful in the management of multinational corporations and similar entities”). 
170 See generally ZERK, supra note 43, at 104–42 (discussing the problem of jurisdiction as it 
relates to regulation of the social and environmental activities of multinational corporations). 
171 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78q (2006). 
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requirements contained in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.172 These reporting requirements were recently revised 
pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.173 However, none of these 
statutes requires that a corporation report its negative social outputs, and the 
Sarbanes-Oxley amendments do not impose additional requirements with 
respect to a corporation’s environmental impacts. 
Environmental concerns are, however, relevant to Regulation S-K, 
Items 101,174 103,175 303,176 and 503.177 Item 101 requires disclosure of 
costs of complying with environmental law.178 Item 103 requires disclosure 
of any “administrative or judicial proceeding ... arising under any Federal, 
State or local” environmental law.179 Item 303 requires disclosure of known 
trends, events, commitments, and uncertainties that are reasonably likely to 
have a material effect on the registrant’s financial condition or results of 
operation.180 Lastly, Item 503 requires a discussion of the most significant 
factors, such as environmental factors, that make an investment in the com-
pany speculative or risky.181 Despite the fact that Sarbanes-Oxley did not 
impose increased environmental reporting,182 some commentators note that 
the SEC’s interpretations of the existing regulations suggest the agency is 
applying greater scrutiny on certifying and quantifying such environmen-
tal liabilities.183 
                                                 
172 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.10 (2011). 
173 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 401–409, 116 Stat. 745, 
785–791 (2002) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78m). 
174 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(xii). 
175 17 C.F.R. § 229.103. 
176 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (requiring the disclosure of rare events that materially 
affect the company). 
177 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.503 (requiring disclosure of risk factors); HERBERT S. WANDER, 
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK 
SERIES: SECURITIES LAW DISCLOSURE AFTER SARBANES-OXLEY AND DODD-FRANK 493, 
670–71, 883–84 (2011) (explaining that Item 503 requires disclosure of risk factors and how 
Items 101, 103, and 303 apply to environmental disclosures). 
178 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(xii) (2010). 
179 17 C.F.R. § 229.103. 
180 17 C.F.R. § 229.303. 
181 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (specifying that risk factor disclosure should clearly identify the 
risk and articulate how that risk affects the company). 
182 See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE: SEC SHOULD 
EXPLORE WAYS TO IMPROVE TRACKING AND TRANSPARENCY OF INFORMATION 8 (2004), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/243371.pdf (concluding that “[w]hile [Sarbanes-
Oxley] does not contain provisions that specifically address environmental disclosure, some 
of them could lead to improved reporting of environmental liabilities”) (emphasis added)). 
183 WANDER, supra note 177, at 889–90. 
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Consider, for example, the SEC’s February 8, 2010 interpretive release on 
climate change.184 SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro emphasized that it neither 
created any new legal requirements nor modified existing requirements, but 
that it instead was “intended to provide clarity and enhance consistency”185 
regarding climate change-related disclosures. To that end, the release identi-
fied four main areas in which climate change may prompt disclosure re-
quirements, to wit: (1) impact of legislation and regulation;186 (2) impact of 
international accords;187 (3) indirect consequences of regulation or business 
trends;188 and (4) physical impact of climate change.189 
Practically speaking, disclosure under Item 303—“Management’s Dis-
cussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, or 
MD&A”190—is potentially the most fruitful avenue by which a corporation 
might disclose its environmental impacts in relation to climate change. How-
ever, the SEC’s climate change release does not change the framework for 
preparing MD&A disclosure, and simply reiterates the traditional MD&A 
analysis that turns entirely on management’s conclusions regarding the “ma-
terial effect” of environmental impacts on the company’s financial condition.191 
The “materiality” standard has been criticized by some scholars for its 
failure to fully account for a corporation’s total environmental impacts.192 
Jennifer Zerk explains: “apart from information that is necessary to assess 
the financial position and prospects of the corporate group, these [environ-
mental and social] disclosures are still largely voluntary.”193 In addition to 
                                                 
184 Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. 
6290 (Feb. 8, 2010) [hereinafter Climate Change Release]. 
185 Mary Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement Before the Open 
Commission Meeting on Disclosure Related to Business or Legislative Events on the 
Issue of Climate Change (Jan. 27, 2010), available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/2010/sp
ch012710mls-climate.htm; see also Subcommittee on Annual Review, Committee on Fed-
eral Regulation of Securities, ABA Section of Business Law, Annual Review of Federal Secu-
rities Regulation: Section I: Regulatory Developments 2010, 66 BUS. LAW 665, 749–54 (2011); 
Wander, supra note 177, at 892–93. 
186 Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9106, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 6925, 6295–96 (Feb. 8, 2010). 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 6295–97. 
190 Id. at 6294–95. 
191 See id. at 6295; see also Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition 
and Results of Operations: Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 33-6835, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,429 (May 24, 1989). 
192 Mitchell F. Crusto, Endangered Green Reports: “Cumulative Materiality” in Cor-
porate Environmental Disclosure After Sarbanes-Oxley, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 483, 497, 
500 (2005). 
193 ZERK, supra note 43, at 175. 
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the voluntary nature of environmental disclosure, other commentators argue 
that federal securities law has been unsuccessful in promoting corporate en-
vironmental protection in general.194 Mitchell Crusto has described the SEC’s 
materiality standard as “elusive”195 and suggests adopting the American So-
ciety of Testing and Materials (ASTM) Cumulative Materiality Standards of 
Corporate Environmental Disclosure to broaden the scope of materiality to 
include total environmental impacts, not simply those that are material to a 
corporation’s financial condition.196 Alternatively, drawing upon recent 
shareholder proposals, Perry Wallace suggests the introduction of a fiduci-
ary duty to investigate and monitor greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.197 At 
present, however, it appears that the SEC will stay the course and continue 
to require the traditional materiality standard, ensuring that corporations 
traded publicly in the United States remain free to omit, or selectively dis-
close, “non-material” environmental impacts. 
2. Private Enforcement 
Many states do not grant to non-residents any rights to enforce domestic 
environmental or health and safety regulations.198 This does not mean, how-
ever, that foreign plaintiffs are left without a forum to pursue an enforce-
ment action against MNCs. This Section identifies three vehicles through 
which individuals may assert claims against MNCs: trade practice actions, 
OECD actions, and the Alien Tort Statute.199 
a. Trade Practice Actions 
Private individuals opposing the actions of MNCs may file a complaint 
under domestic trade practice legislation.200 However, these actions only 
address a MNC’s “statements and representations”201 regarding its trade 
practices. Accordingly, trade practice actions provide a remedy for indi-
rectly holding MNCs accountable for alleged trade practice violations.202 
                                                 
194 Crusto, supra note 192, at 500. 
195 Id. at 497. 
196 Id. at 500–09. 
197 Wallace, supra note 81, at 322 (citing Interfaith Ctr. on Corp. Responsibility, Pro-
posed Shareholder Resolution on Embedded Climate Risk, available at http://www.iccr.org
/shareholder/proxy_book03/environment/climaterisk_oxy.htm (accessed by entering URL 
in the Internet Archive index)). 
198 ZERK, supra note 43, at 182–83. 
199 See id. at 183–85. 
200 Id. at 185. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
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Despite the indirect nature of these actions, some proponents point to 
the Nike, Inc. v. Kasky203 litigation in the United States as evidence of the 
“potential to cause a great deal of embarrassment for companies.”204 In that 
case, sweatshop activist Marc Kasky brought suit against Nike in California, 
alleging that Nike had misled the public regarding the company’s foreign 
suppliers’ workplace standards, in violation of the California Business and 
Professions Code.205 Nike prevailed in the California Court of Appeals but 
lost in the California Supreme Court, and the U.S. Supreme Court ultimate-
ly dismissed the appeal.206 Three months after the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion, the parties reached a settlement207 in which Nike agreed to pay $1.5 
million to the Fair Labor Association without admitting any wrongdoing.208 
The apparent success of the Kasky v. Nike litigation belies the fact that 
Nike continues to purchase materials from foreign clothing suppliers with 
substandard workplace conditions.209 Furthermore, California stands alone 
as the only state to offer the particular “private attorney general action”210 
used by Kasky.211 As this suggests, the effectiveness of this unique right of 
action depends largely on “shaming” MNCs through media spotlight and 
public outrage. Moreover, as the settlement terms and subsequent practice 
suggest, even where trade practice actions are successful, they fail to per-
suade MNCs to modify their business practices. 
b. OECD Actions 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
is an international organization comprised of thirty-four member states focused 
                                                 
203 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (per curiam); see SARAH JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 101–11 (Colin Harvey ed., 2004) (providing an overview of 
the case and its impact on both corporations and consumer rights litigation). 
204 ZERK, supra note 43, at 185. 
205 See Nike, 539 U.S. at 656 (Stevens, J., concurring); ZERK, supra note 43, at 185. See 
generally CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17200–17209 (West 2012) (providing the governing pro-
visions of the California Business and Professions Code). 
206 JOSEPH, supra note 203, at 102. The case was ultimately dismissed on jurisdictional 
grounds. See Nike, 539 U.S. at 657–58 (Stephens, J., concurring) (articulating the reasons 
that supported the decision to dismiss the grant of certiorari, including failure by the California 
Supreme Court to properly enter final judgment and a lack of standing by either party). 
207 JOSEPH, supra note 203, at 102, 104–05. 
208 Id. at 104–05. 
209 See Locke et al., supra note 133, at 20–21 (discussing how Nike’s new monitoring 
systems failed to produce an improvement in working conditions within Nike’s suppliers); 
Snyder, supra note 103, at 595–96 (discussing the same). 
210 ZERK, supra note 43, at 185; see also CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17203, 17206. 
211 ZERK, supra note 43, at 185. The Australian Trade Practices Act of 1974, however, 
permits “any person” to apply “to have legislative prohibitions on misleading or deceptive 
conduct enforced” regardless of whether the person is a resident of Australia and without a 
showing of personal harm by the defendant’s conduct. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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on “promot[ing] policies that will improve the economic and social well-
being of people around the world.”212 In 1976, pursuant to this mission, the 
OECD proposed Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guide-
lines).213 The OECD Guidelines were adopted by the OECD Council as part 
of the broader Declaration on International Investment and Multinational En-
terprises.214 The OECD Guidelines are occasionally updated, most recently 
on May 25, 2011 in conjunction with the OECD’s fiftieth anniversary.215 A 
total of forty-four governments, representing 85% of the world’s foreign di-
rect investment, have agreed to adhere by the OECD Guidelines and encour-
age their enterprises to observe them wherever they operate.216 
Private individuals may raise issues concerning compliance with the 
OECD Guidelines with the correct National Contact Point (NCP).217 No-
tably, the 2000 Revision to the OECD Guidelines extends its scope to non-
adhering countries, theoretically easing the burden of territorial jurisdiction 
over MNCs.218 Once a compliance issue has been raised, the NCP is obli-
gated to “contribute to the resolution of issues that arise relating to imple-
mentation of the Guidelines in specific instances.”219 In resolving these 
issues, the NCP is authorized to make an initial assessment of whether the 
issues merit further examination and to offer aid to parties involved in re-
solving the issues.220 If the parties fail to reach an agreement, the NCP is 
required to issue a statement containing appropriate “recommendations on 
the implementation of the Guidelines.”221 
OECD actions may overcome the hurdle of territorial jurisdiction and bring 
the parties to the table. However, these actions lack any enforcement mecha-
nism to ensure compliance.222 Furthermore, the NCP’s mediation procedures 
                                                 
212 About the OECD: The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), OECD, http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103_1_1_1_1_
1,00.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
213 See OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 2011 Update, OECD, http://www
.oecd.org/document/28/0,3746,en_2649_34889_2397532_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Mar. 
23, 2013). 
214 OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, at 13 (2011), http://www.
oecd.org/daf/internationalinvestment/guidelinesformultinationalenterprises/48004323.pdf. 
215 Id. at 3. 
216 About the OECD, supra note 212. 
217 OECD, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Revision 2000, at 31–33, 
35–37 (June 2000), http://www.jussemper.org/Resources/Corporate%20Activity/Resources
/OECDGuidelines15419.pdf; ZERK, supra note 43, at 184. 
218 See id. at 31. 
219 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, supra note 213, at 72. 
220 Id. 
221 Id. at 73. 
222 ZERK, supra note 43, at 184 (also noting that the Guidelines are non-binding). 
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are confidential, and recommendations are only revealed to the public if the 
NCP determines confidentiality would be contrary to effective implementa-
tion of the OECD Guidelines.223 
c. Alien Tort Statute 
In recent decades, the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)224 has been at the fore-
front of litigation against MNCs in the United States. The ATS provides 
that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action 
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States.”225 The decades following the landmark case of 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala226 witnessed some success in using the ATS to hold 
MNCs responsible for their participation in human rights abuses.227 Similar 
actions against MNCs for their participation in environmental abuses, how-
ever, were not as successful due to the reluctance on the part of federal 
courts to find that principles of international environmental law have crys-
tallized into customary international law as contemplated by Filartiga.228 
Moreover, the window of corporate liability under the ATS may be 
quickly closing. On February 28, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral 
arguments in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell.229 The main issue in Kiobel is 
whether corporations may be held liable for violations of the law of nations, 
such as torture, extrajudicial killings, or genocide.230 Surprisingly, less than 
one week later, on March 5, 2012, the Supreme Court ordered the case “re-
stored to the calendar for reargument” and directed the parties to file briefs on 
                                                 
223 Id. at 184–85. 
224 Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
225 Id. 
226 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
227 See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 
318–19 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Historically, states, and to a lesser extent individuals, have been 
held liable under international law. However, ... substantial international and United States 
precedent indicates that corporations may also be held liable under international law, at least 
for gross human rights violations.”). 
228 See, e.g., Beanal v. Freeport McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding 
that plaintiff and amici submissions “refer to a general sense of environmental responsibility 
and state abstract rights and liberties devoid of articulable or discernable [sic] standards and 
regulations to identify practices that constitute international environmental abuses or torts”); 
Flores v. S. Peru Copper Co., 414 F.3d 233, 250–52 (2d Cir. 2003) (articulating and applying 
the sources of international law). 
229 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (Oct. 17, 2011); Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/kio
bel-v-royal-dutch-petroleum/?wpmp_switcher=desktop (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
230 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 115–17. 
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the issue of “[w]hether and under what circumstances the Alien Tort Statute, 
28 U.S.C. §1350, allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of 
the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the 
United States.”231 The expansion of the issue from general corporate liability 
under the ATS to the existence of a cause of action under the ATS does not 
bode well for the statute’s proponents, as it may signal that the Court is in-
clined to interpret the ATS as a jurisdictional statute not giving rise to any 
special cause of action. Such a result would effectively remove one of the 
sharpest arrows from the quivers of potential foreign plaintiffs seeking to hold 
MNCs accountable in U.S. courts. 
C. Conclusion 
This Part has explained the shortcomings and flaws of CSR and the cur-
rent regulatory regime with respect to MNCs. The various iterations of 
CSR, including CR reporting, codes of conduct, and constituency statutes, 
are voluntary, passive, and unenforceable mechanisms to regulate corporate 
behavior. Any attempt to expand private rights of action against MNCs has 
been consistently met with swift political opposition. Extraterritorial regula-
tion of MNCs remains elusive at the international level, and prospects for 
changing this status quo are slim. 
The reality is that the world’s largest corporations operate in a suprana-
tional arena where traditional jurisdictional boundaries are increasingly irrel-
evant. Moreover, as the history of CSR and attempted global regulatory 
schemes makes clear, there is no “silver bullet” solution to this problem. Lar-
ry Catá Backer opines that the failure of CSR “might indicate that political 
institutions might not be the appropriate vehicle for the elaboration of reg-
ulatory systems based on such substantive notions .... Rather it might sug-
gest the possibility of substantive regulation devolving to non–political 
actors.”232 Backer makes a valuable point, which invites the question of 
how to incentivize “non–political actors” (for example, corporations) to 
enforce substantive regulations. 
One can come much closer to a viable solution to this problem once one 
accepts the limitations of regulation and entertains the idea of fundamental-
ly altering the very nature and purpose of the corporate entity itself. After 
decades of unsuccessful attempts to regulate MNCs, the pendulum of corpo-
rate law has begun to swing away from government regulation and towards 
                                                 
231 Order in Pending Case, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2012) 
(Order No. 10-1491) (Mar. 5, 2012), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders
/courtorders/030512zr.pdf. 
232 Backer, Moral Obligation, supra note 43, at 620. 
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the creation of innovative corporate forms that weave social and environ-
mental responsibility into the fabric of these entities. By constantly pursuing 
blended values, social enterprise forces all interested parties, including in-
vestors, shareholders, directors, courts, counsel, and stakeholders, to confront 
and resolve competing interests with the overarching goal of achieving meas-
urable social and environmental benefits. The growing demand for innova-
tion in this arena has led to the rapid enactment of social enterprise entities 
in both Europe and the United States. This Article now departs from the 
world of CSR and corporate regulation and turns to social enterprise in Eu-
rope, focusing on how the social enterprise movement manifests itself in 
European corporate law. 
II. SOCIAL ENTERPRISE IN EUROPE: SOCIAL COOPERATIVES AND THE 
COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANY 
A. Introduction to European Social Enterprise 
Europe is the birthplace of modern social enterprise, having arisen out 
of traditional concepts of social cooperation.233 In general, the modern Eu-
ropean movement is defined by different types of social cooperatives aimed 
at providing work integration services and personal services for the disad-
vantaged.234 Jacques Defourny identifies the Italian Parliament’s enactment 
of the “social solidarity cooperative” in 1991 as the beginning of the mod-
ern social enterprise movement in Europe.235 In Italy, these organizations 
quickly gained acceptance. As of 2005, Italy was home to more than 7300 
social cooperatives employing some 244,000 people.236 Other European 
countries quickly followed Italy’s lead and enacted their own social coop-
erative organizations.237 
This Part traces the development of social enterprise in Europe during the 
preceding two decades. In doing so, this Part contrasts the social cooperatives 
of continental Europe with the United Kingdom’s Community Interest Com-
panies (CICs) and identifies a recent resurgence in social enterprise in the wake 
of a global recession. This Part concludes by outlining the European Parlia-
ment’s efforts to use social enterprise as a tool to boost the European economy. 
                                                 
233 See Defourny, supra note 27. 
234 See generally Defourny & Nyssens, supra note 31. 
235 Id. at 205–06. The Italian law identifies two types of social cooperatives, to wit: 
(1) cooperative sociali di tipo a (“Type-A Social Cooperatives”), which provide social, 
health and educational services; and (2) cooperative sociali di tipo b (“Type-B Social 
Cooperatives”), which provide work integration for disadvantaged people. Id. at 205. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. at 206. 
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B. Social Cooperatives 
Social cooperatives are the most widespread social enterprise entities in 
Europe. Since 1991, nearly every European jurisdiction has authorized its 
own social cooperative entity.238 However, the concept of social enterprise 
in Europe remains narrowly interpreted as a synonym for charitable work.239 
As a result, the majority of the social enterprise sector in Europe focuses on 
social, not environmental, problems. Furthermore, like charities, social co-
operatives are generally prohibited from distributing profits to sharehold-
ers.240 The result of these policies is generally a work integration social en-
terprise (WISE), the most popular type of social cooperative in Europe, 
whose singular goal “is to help low-qualified unemployed people, who are 
at risk of permanent exclusion from the labour market.”241 
For example, WISEs have been available to social entrepreneurs in Portu-
gal and Spain for over a decade. In 1997, Portugal authorized the cooperativa 
de solidariedade social (social solidarity cooperative),242 and in 1999, Spain 
created the cooperativa de iniciativa social (social initiative cooperative).243 
Some social cooperatives were introduced to tackle very specific issues. 
For example, Greece created the Koinonikos Syneterismos Periorismenis 
Eufthinis, KoiSPE (limited liability social co-operative), an entity designed 
to promote partnerships between psychiatric hospital workers and individ-
uals with psychosocial disabilities.244 In 2002, France created the société 
coopérative d’intérêt collectif, (SCIC) (collective interest co-operative soci-
ety), a multi-stakeholder cooperative dedicated to local development pro-
jects.245 In 2003, Finland introduced the Finnish Act of Social Enterprise, 
which created a WISE specifically aimed at creating employment for peo-
ple with disabilities.246 
Belgium, in contrast, has taken a different approach. In 1996, Belgium creat-
ed the société à finalité sociale, (SFS) (social purpose company) designation247 
                                                 
238 Id. at 206–07; see also EVA HECKL ET AL., STUDY ON PRACTICES AND POLICIES IN THE 
SOCIAL ENTERPRISE SECTOR IN EUROPE 5 (2007) (noting that these new entities are usually 
implemented in concert with new regulatory provisions and financial support instruments). 
239 See generally Defourny & Nyssens, supra note 31, at 206–09. 
240 See infra Part IV; Fei, supra note 24, at 37 (observing that “in continental Europe the 
phrase [social enterprise] often has a narrower meaning, sometimes conditioned on the 
presence of specific attributes in the enterprise with less emphasis on its business aspects”). 
241 Defourny & Nyssens, supra note 31, at 207. 
242 Id. at 206. 
243 Id. 
244 Id. 
245 Id. 
246 Id. at 208. 
247 Id. at 206. 
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and introduced project grants for environmental cooperatives engaged in the 
recycling and reuse of materials.248 As the term “designation” suggests, Bel-
gium’s legislation did not create a new corporate entity, but rather created a 
certification available to all types of business organizations. In order to ob-
tain this certification, the organization must define a profit allocation policy 
and permit employee participation in the organization’s governance structure 
through ownership of capital shares.249 
More recently, social cooperatives have spread to central and eastern Eu-
ropean countries. Defourny argues that the growth of social enterprise in east-
ern European countries lagged behind their western counterparts due in large 
part to cultural and legal obstacles that remained after the fall of the Soviet 
Union in 1989.250 He highlights several obstacles to social enterprise in east-
ern Europe, including cultural opposition and skepticism to cooperative 
forms, excessive dependence on donor contributions, the absence of legal 
frameworks to regulate cooperatives, a general lack of confidence in solidari-
ty movements, and the predominance of parochial political cultures that es-
chewed alternative corporate governance structures.251 Despite these barriers, 
Defourny estimates that half of all central and eastern European states have 
enacted at least one new cooperative organization in recent years.252 
A review of the emergence of social cooperatives throughout Europe 
makes clear that these new entities enjoy near-universal support. Social 
cooperatives are designed to encourage “entrepreneurial and commercial 
dynamics that are an integral part of a social project ... provid[ing] a way 
of formalising the multi-stakeholder nature of numerous initiatives.”253 
However, this narrow view of social enterprise has not succeeded in ad-
dressing local or regional environmental concerns, nor has it encouraged 
social cooperatives to expand into the growing sectors of low-carbon en-
ergy production or so-called “clean technology.” Moreover, countries that 
                                                 
248 See HECKL ET AL., supra note 238, at 27. 
249 Defourny & Nyssens, supra note 31, at 206–07. Defourny and Nyssens criticize this 
approach as unsuccessful, explaining that it “involve[s] a considerable number of re-
quirements ... without bringing a real value added for the concerned organizations.” Id. at 
207. In a similar vein, other European countries offer government-sponsored awards to 
corporations in an effort to induce them to make significant contributions to sustainability 
or human rights issues. ZERK, supra note 43, at 194. Examples of such awards can be found 
in the Netherlands, Denmark, Spain, and the UK. Id. While these government-sponsored 
awards are available to any organization, social cooperatives appear to be uniquely po-
sitioned to take advantage of these awards given their social purpose, community in-
volvement, and innovative business models. 
250 Defourny, supra note 27. 
251 Id. 
252 Id. (identifying examples in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia). 
253 Id. 
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have explored alternative corporate designations, like Belgium, have not 
proved successful. Belgium’s SFS designation imposes restrictions on profit 
distribution but does not offer any advantages for raising capital other than 
the branding value associated with the designation.254 As Matthew Doeringer 
notes, in the eight years following the creation of the SFS designation, 
“only 400 SFSs registered with the Belgian government.”255 
Thus, while social cooperatives dominate continental Europe, the adher-
ence to the narrow view of social enterprise has hamstrung a movement seek-
ing to offer alternative business models in many areas beyond work integra-
tion. The United Kingdom has taken a markedly different approach. A decade 
ago, the U.K. adopted a view of for-profit, mission-driven social enterprise, 
and it now enjoys the most robust social enterprise sector in Europe.256 
C. Community Interest Companies (CICs) 
In 2010, Stephen Lloyd, one of the architects of the CIC, explained 
that the idea for this entity arose out of a growing sense of frustration with 
corporate law in the U.K.257 Lloyd noted that traditional English corporate 
law made it “quite complicated to embed social purposes in a legal form be-
cause there was not an off-the-shelf, simple-to-use legal entity ready for so-
cial enterprise unless you used the old-fashioned industrial and provident 
societies—the law for which has not been updated since 1965.”258 Lloyd 
proposed the creation of just such an “off-the-shelf” entity for social entre-
preneurs, the CIC.259 
In 2001, the British government “established the Social Enterprise Unit 
... to identify barriers to the growth of the social-enterprise sector ... and to 
develop strategies to overcome these obstacles.”260 In its first report, is-
sued one year later, the Unit defined social enterprise as “a business with 
primarily social objectives whose surpluses are principally reinvested for 
that purpose in the business or in the community, rather than being driven 
by the need to maximise profit for shareholders and owners.”261 In contrast 
                                                 
254 Matthew F. Doeringer, Note, Fostering Social Enterprise: A Historical and International 
Analysis, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291, 309 (2010). 
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to continental Europe’s definition, the Unit’s definition does not relegate so-
cial enterprise to work integration and, importantly, permits profit distribution. 
With popular and government support behind the Social Enterprise 
Unit’s conclusions, policies were quickly put into place to foster the growth 
of social enterprise in the U.K. These included the creation of a website, the 
opening of regional social enterprise development centers, the selection of 
thirty-five social enterprise ambassadors tasked with spreading information 
in local communities, the establishment of a £10 million fund for invest-
ment in social enterprise, and the creation of programs to develop better 
metrics for valuing the social benefits produced by social enterprise.262 
Most importantly, Parliament followed through with the Unit’s sugges-
tion to create a corporate entity specifically designed for social enterprise.263 
Three years after the creation of the Unit, Parliament authorized the CIC as 
part of the 2004 Companies Act.264 In general, the CIC is a limited company, 
with governance primarily enshrined in the board of directors,265 but subject 
to restrictions designed to ensure that it will serve community interests.266 
These restrictions operate on both the entity and regulatory levels. At 
the entity level, a social entrepreneur incorporating a CIC has two choices, 
to limit the CIC by guarantee or by shares.267 If limited by guarantee, the 
CIC adopts a charitable model by guaranteeing that all profits will be rein-
vested in the company.268 If limited by shares, the CIC embraces a blended 
value model and operates like a traditional limited company.269 CICs lim-
ited by shares are permitted to raise equity and distribute dividends to 
shareholders, capped at 35% of the aggregate total company profits.270 
                                                                                                                         
archive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070108124358/http:/cabinetoffice.gov.uk/third_sector/docum
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265 Dana Brakman Reiser, Governing and Financing Blended Enterprise, 85 CHI.-KENT 
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266 Reiser, supra note 265, at 634–35. 
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At the regulatory level, all CICs are overseen by the CIC Regulator.271 
As a procedural matter, CICs must first register with the Companies House, 
a government registry in the U.K. similar to the Secretaries of State in the 
United States.272 Founders of CICs must also sign a Community Interest 
Statement detailing how they will deliver a “community purpose.”273 CIC 
directors are thereafter responsible for submitting annual reports to the CIC 
Regulator, which must “confirm that access to the benefits it provides will 
not be confined to an unduly restricted group.”274 The overarching goal of 
CIC regulation is to ensure compliance with the so-called “Community In-
terest Test,” to wit: whether “a reasonable person might consider [the] activ-
ity [as] being carried on [by the CIC] for the benefit of the community.”275 
The CIC Regulator, who is appointed by the Secretary of State for Business 
and Innovation,276 is responsible for maintaining public confidence in the 
CIC brand277 and enforcing the community interest test.278 To that end, the 
CIC Regulator has “surprisingly wide”279 powers to intervene in CIC opera-
tions, including ordering independent audits at the Regulator’s expense,280 
commencing civil proceedings to intervene in the CIC’s affairs,281 removing 
directors,282 and appointing a “manager” to run the CIC after the directors 
have been removed.283 
In addition to government regulation, CICs are also subject to an “asset 
lock.”284 The asset lock caps shareholder dividends,285 and imposes a duty 
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272 Lloyd, supra note 257, at 35. 
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on CIC directors to ensure that they obtain fair market value on the sale of 
any CIC asset.286 In practice, this prevents a CIC’s assets from being raided 
by selling them for below-market prices to a for-profit company owned by 
the directors, simultaneously turning a considerable profit for the directors 
and undermining the community interest goal of the CIC.287 Furthermore, in 
the event of dissolution, the asset lock prevents the distribution of assets to 
directors, members, or equity holders.288 Instead, all assets must go to an-
other entity whose assets are similarly “locked” into community benefits.289 
Unlike many social cooperatives, which include stakeholder governance 
requirements, CICs are encouraged, but not required, to include stakeholder 
groups in their decision-making processes.290 The CIC Regulator strongly 
encourages several techniques designed to incorporate stakeholders in 
governance, such as circulating newsletters, holding stakeholder meetings, 
establishing interactive websites, or giving certain stakeholder groups stand-
ing in the CIC’s organic documents by requiring that they be consulted before 
CIC directors make certain types of decisions.291 While none of these stake-
holder integration techniques are mandated, all CICs must make some efforts 
and detail those efforts in the annual report submitted to the CIC Regulator.292 
Thus, in contrast to continental Europe’s social cooperatives, the U.K.’s 
CIC embraces a blended-value interpretation of social enterprise. Since 2004, 
CICs have grown faster than any social enterprise entity in Europe. In less 
than two years after its enactment, there were over 1000 CICs in the U.K.293 
As of April 2012, there were nearly 6400 registered CICs,294 representing 
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more than double the rate of anticipated growth.295 This accelerated growth 
is due in large part to the flexibility of CICs to operate in virtually any eco-
nomic sector. Indeed, CICs have succeeded in agriculture, manufacturing, 
nurseries, and environmental projects like waste recycling, low-carbon mi-
cro-generation energy systems, and wind farms.296 
Despite the growth and popularity of the CIC, some commentators sug-
gest the entity is too restrictive. Doeringer notes that the ECT Group, one of 
the early success stories of the CIC form and the U.K.’s largest CIC in 2006 
and 2007, suffered adversely from the dividend restrictions and found it diffi-
cult to raise capital in equity markets.297 By 2008, the ECT Group was forced 
to sell nearly all of its assets to cover its debt.298 Dana Brakman Reiser has 
also criticized the dividend restrictions, contending that CICs offer investors 
the opportunity to hold shares in a CIC but entitle the owners of such shares 
to receive “midstream profits only—and these profits remain capped.”299 
CICs do not confer any tax benefits beyond those available to traditional 
companies, and they are subject to entity-level taxes despite their dedication to 
charitable goals.300 Stephen Lloyd has argued that tax breaks are necessary 
to encourage investment in CICs, in particular so-called “patient capi-
tal”—socially responsible investors looking for a “long term, bond rate of 
return.”301 In the absence of tax breaks, Lloyd, Michael Webber, and Arthur 
Wood have advocated for a new entity, the social enterprise limited liability 
partnership (SELLP), which would provide entrepreneurs with a pass-through 
tax entity to pursue the blended value missions of their enterprises.302 
While the CIC may require some fine-tuning, its current structure has 
achieved considerable success. Although some have questioned the sustain-
ability of this growth,303 CICs continue to flourish in the traditionally charitable 
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areas, as well as in the private sector. This flexibility may alleviate concerns 
about the sustainability of the CIC and mitigate funding issues in certain 
sectors. While tax breaks or a refined dividend capping system might foster 
further investment in CICs, it appears that such reforms are not immediately 
necessary to fulfill the community interest goals already being achieved by 
thousands of CICs across the U.K. 
D. The Future of Social Enterprise in Europe 
Recently, the European Union (EU) acknowledged that its efforts to 
produce an efficient “internal market” have fallen short of expectations.304 
These shortcomings are painfully obvious in the current European economy, 
particularly in the so-called “PIGS” (Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain).305 
To remedy these shortcomings, the EU adopted a “Europe 2020” strate-
gy,306 which sets goals for “smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.”307 In 
order to implement the Europe 2020 strategy, the European Commission 
released several communications to the European Parliament advocating 
“measures likely to foster growth and employment.”308 These measures 
were set forth in the Commission’s April 13, 2011 communication entitled 
Single Market Act: Twelve Levers to Boost Growth and Strengthen Confi-
dence.309 Given the relative success of social cooperatives and CICs, it is 
not surprising that one of these “levers” is social entrepreneurship.310 
To that end, the Commission suggested comprehensive European legisla-
tion to develop a framework for social investment funds, which would “scale 
up the impact of national initiatives by opening Single Market opportuni-
ties”311 to investors from all Member States. In this way, the Commission 
hopes to build upon the growing trend of social enterprise by promoting soci-
etal concerns such as social, ethical, and environmental development over 
financial profit.312 Indeed, the Commission estimated that social cooperatives 
represent more than 4.8 million European jobs, and it believed that many 
more can be created to stem the rising tide of unemployment.313 
                                                 
304 See Single Market Act: Twelve Levers to Boost Growth and Strengthen Confidence, 
at 24–25, COM (2011) 206 final (Apr. 13, 2011). 
305 Id. 
306 See Europe 2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth, at 2, 
COM (2010) 2020 final (Mar. 3, 2010). 
307 Id. at 5; see also Single Market Act, supra note 304, at 3. 
308 Single Market Act, supra note 304, at 3. 
309 Id. 
310 Id. at 14–15. 
311 Id. at 14. 
312 Id. at 14–15. 
313 Id. at 15 n.49. 
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In keeping with continental Europe’s charity-centric view of social en-
terprise, the European Commission released a “Social Business Initiative” 
to operate within the framework of the European Platform against Poverty 
and Social Exclusion.314 Notably, the Commission emphasized a 2009 study 
that concluded that approximately one in four businesses founded in Europe 
fall under the umbrella of social enterprise.315 The Social Business Initiative 
addressed several shortcomings of the current social enterprise sector and 
set forth an action plan to address these concerns. First, echoing the sugges-
tions of the “Twelve Levers” communication, the Commission suggested 
creating a regulatory framework for investment vehicles at the European 
level to increase private funding to social enterprises.316 This includes a 
proposal for a €90 million financial instrument to facilitate cross-border 
funding for the start-up, development, and expansion of social enterpris-
es.317 Second, to increase the visibility of social enterprise, the Commission 
suggested identifying best practices in the sector, creating a public database 
of labels and certifications, and the promotion of mutual learning and capac-
ity building at the national and regional level.318 Third, to improve the legal 
environment, the Commission proposed reforming the Statute for a European 
Cooperative Society to simplify regulation and conducting a study on the status 
of social cooperatives in all Member States.319 Lastly, to facilitate government 
funding of social enterprise, the Commission suggested simplifying the rules 
regarding State aid to work integration and personal services, and enhancing 
social and health elements in the government procurement process.320 
These communications make clear that Europe’s governing bodies are 
increasingly serious about fostering the growth of social enterprise. Creating 
a Europe-wide regulatory scheme and regional investment funds appear to 
be necessary steps to elevate social enterprise from the national level to the 
regional level. However, whether the European Parliament follows through 
with these suggestions remains to be seen. 
For the moment, European social enterprise operates on the local and state 
levels. The legal landscape continues to be a patchwork of social cooperatives 
                                                 
314 Social Business Initiative: Creating a Favourable Climate for Social Enterprises, Key 
Stakeholders in the Social Economy and Innovation, at 2, COM (2011) 682 final (Oct. 25, 
2011) [hereinafter Creating a Favourable Climate for Social Enterprises]. 
315 Id. at 3; see also SIRI TERJESEN ET AL., GLOBAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP MONITOR, 
2009 REPORT ON SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP 20 (2009), available at http://www.gemcon
sortium.org/docs/download/2519. 
316 Creating a Favourable Climate for Social Enterprises, supra note 314, at 6–7. 
317 Id. at 8. 
318 Id.; see also CIC Register, supra note 294. 
319 Creating a Favourable Climate for Social Enterprises, supra note 314, at 10. 
320 See id. at 10–11. 
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and designations that enjoy varying degrees of success. The U.K.’s CIC, 
however, appears to confirm that embracing minimal profit distribution has 
been a key factor in the expansion and success of social enterprise. Despite 
this conclusion, the suggestions of the European Commission continue to re-
flect a narrow view of social enterprises as strictly charitable organizations. 
Indeed, the prohibition on profit distribution and the rejection of blended-
value models will likely impede the growth of social enterprise in an eco-
nomic climate that cries out for innovation and mold-breaking approaches. 
In contrast, the next Part explores the recent emergence of social enterprise 
entities in the United States, which bear a much closer resemblance to the 
U.K. than continental Europe. 
III. SOCIAL ENTERPRISE IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. First Generation Entities 
In contrast with Europe, where social enterprise entities have been in ex-
istence for decades, the social enterprise revolution in corporate law in the 
United States is still in its early stages.321 However, the past five years have 
witnessed significant growth in both financing for social enterprise and in-
creased diversity along the spectrum of entities offered to social entrepre-
neurs. Indeed, socially responsible investments grew more than 13% in the 
face of the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression,322 and ac-
count for more than $3 trillion in professionally managed assets in the United 
States.323 
A number of entities have been authorized in U.S. jurisdictions that pur-
portedly serve the mission-driven purpose of social entrepreneurs,324 and 
unlike Europe, these entities are not subject to a prohibition on the distribu-
tion of profits to shareholders. In the United States, social enterprise and its 
accompanying entities constitute a so-called “fourth sector” of the econo-
my325 uniquely committed to simultaneously earning profits for shareholders 
                                                 
321 See Sarah Stankorb, Where Did Social Enterprise Come From Anyway?, GOOD (Mar. 
8, 2012), http://www.good.is/post/where-did-social-enterprise-come-from-anyway (quoting 
Jay Coen Gilbert, co-founder of B Labs: “this was a long process of gestation”). 
322 See 2010 US-SIF REPORT, supra note 10, at 8. 
323 Id. 
324 See generally infra Part III.B–E (discussing L3Cs, Flexible Purpose Corporations, 
Social Purpose Corporations, and Benefit Corporations). 
325 Kelley, supra note 7, at 340 (“According to [proponents of social enterprise], we are in 
the process of moving beyond the traditional conception of society as divided neatly into three 
sectors—business, nonprofit, and government—and are witnessing the emergence of a new 
fourth sector that encompasses elements of both the business and nonprofit sectors.”); J. 
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and creating social and environmental benefits.326 This Part identifies and dis-
cusses four recently enacted social enterprise entities, to wit: (1) Low-Profit 
Limited Liability Companies (L3Cs), (2) Flexible Purpose Corporations 
(FPCs), (3) Social Purpose Corporations (SPCs), and (4) Benefit Corporations. 
B. L3Cs 
In 2008, Vermont became the first state to enact the L3C.327 Several 
other states quickly followed suit. At the time of this writing, L3Cs have 
been enacted in six states and two Native American nations,328 and they are 
under consideration in at least twelve state legislatures.329 In general, L3C 
legislation amends a state’s existing Limited Liability Company (LLC) stat-
ute, creating a specific type of LLC subject to certain restrictions designed 
to create a safe and reliable corporate entity for receiving Program Related 
Investments (PRIs) from private foundations.330 In order for an organization 
                                                                                                                         
Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with Profit: Governance, Enforcement, 
Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking in Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2011). 
326 Defourny, supra note 27, at 5. 
327 Jim Condos, Vermont Secretary of State, Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, VT. 
SECRETARY OF ST. (2004), http://www.sec.state.vt.us/corps/dobiz/llc/llc_l3c.htm (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2013); see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27) (2012). 
328 Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-26 (2010); Limited 
Liability Companies, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1302 (2010); Low-Profit Limited Liability 
Company, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 31, § 1611 (2010); Michigan Limited Liability Company Act, 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.4102 (2009); North Carolina Limited Liability Company Act, N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 57C-2-01 (2010). In addition, the Oglala Sioux Tribe and the Crow Indian Nation 
of Montana have also enacted L3C legislation. Laws, AMERICANS FOR COMMUNITY DEV., http://
www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/laws (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). Utah and 
Wyoming enacted similar legislation, their L3C acts were subsequently repealed. Utah Revised 
Limited Liability Company Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-412 (West 2009); Limited Liability 
Companies, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-102 (2009). 
329 See Daniel S. Kleinberger, A Myth Deconstructed: The “Emperor’s New Clothes” on 
the Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879, 880 n.7 (2010) (list-
ing the twelve states in which L3C legislation is currently under consideration). 
330 See MARC J. LANE, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: EMPOWERING MISSION-DRIVEN ENTREPRENEURS 
36 (2011); Doeringer, supra note 254, at 319 (describing the primary purpose of the L3C as 
making it cheaper and easier for foundations to determine where they can invest with PRIs, 
thus increasing available capital for social enterprise); J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, 
The L3C Illusion: Why Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies Will Not Stimulate Socially 
Optimal Private Foundation Investment in Entrepreneurial Ventures, 35 VT. L. REV. 273, 282 
(2010) (“The L3C promoters seek to use this highly malleable LLC form to accomplish 
another goal, namely allowing private foundations to increase their PRIs and thereby to 
provide social benefit.”); Kleinberger, supra note 329, at 884 (“L3C proponents claim that 
L3C status will streamline the PRI process.”); Reiser, supra note 265, at 622 (discussing how 
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to qualify as a L3C, the entity’s articles of incorporation must contain cer-
tain provisions, including: (1) stating a primary charitable or educational pur-
pose, (2) conversely stating that the entity does not have a significant purpose 
for the production of income or appreciation of property, and (3) stating that 
the entity does not have a political or legislative purpose.331 In addition, most 
states require that an L3C include the “L3C” designation in its name.332 
To fully understand the L3C, one must first understand the Internal Reve-
nue Code (IRC) provisions relevant to 501(c)(3) tax-exempt entities. Of the 
twenty-eight types of organizations entitled to be tax-exempt under the IRC, 
the 501(c)(3) entities are the most common, and are divided into two cate-
gories: private foundations and public charities.333 All 501(c)(3)s are sub-
ject to the prohibition on private inurement to the benefit of any private 
shareholder or individual.334 Private foundations, unlike charities, are sub-
ject to stricter regulations and graduated excise taxes,335 but they are permit-
ted to take advantage of PRIs, which have been part of nonprofit law since 
the Tax Reform Act of 1969.336 
In short, PRIs are a way for grant-making foundations to make tax-free 
jeopardy investments in socially beneficial businesses rather than making tra-
ditional grants to charities.337 When a foundation makes a PRI, the IRS per-
mits the foundation to count that grant towards the 5% of the foundation’s 
assets it is required to distribute annually, on pain of excise taxes and poten-
tial loss of tax-exempt status.338 While PRIs offer foundations the option of 
                                                                                                                         
the L3C model was conceived as easily meshing with existing state LLC statutes and how it 
was to contain sufficient restrictions to enable L3Cs to qualify for receipt of PRIs under 
existing IRS rules). 
331 LANE, supra note 330, at 35. 
332 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3005(a)(2) (2012). 
333 Fishman, supra note 26, at 568. 
334 Id. at 584. 
335 Id. at 582 (“Sections 4940 to 4945 were added to the IRC and imposed a sliding 
scale of excise taxes (depending upon the offending foundation’s willingness to correct 
its wrong) for abuses in which Congress felt private foundations were most likely to 
engage.”). For a more thorough discussion of the excise tax provisions applicable to 
private foundations, see Examples of Program-Related Investments, Prop. Treas. Reg. 
§ 53.4944, 77 Fed. Reg. 23,429 (Apr. 19, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. 53.4944-3). 
336 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 4944(c), 83 Stat. 487, 512 (1969). 
337 See Doeringer, supra note 254, at 317. Notably, the Ford Foundation has committed 
over $400 million in PRIs since pioneering the practice in 1968. See FORD FOUND., 
INVESTING FOR SOCIAL GAIN: REFLECTIONS ON TWO DECADES OF PROGRAM-RELATED 
INVESTMENTS 12 (1991). 
338 See I.R.C. § 4944 (2007); see also, e.g., I.R.C. § 4942 (2007) (providing that if a 
foundation does not fulfill the 5% distribution requirement, it can be liable for a 100% tax 
on the undistributed amount). 
684 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:639 
making jeopardy investments to satisfy the 5% annual asset distribution re-
quirement, the IRS has, until very recently, offered little guidance on what 
investments qualify as PRIs. In fact, the IRS has issued only one Private Let-
ter Ruling concerning a PRI to a LLC339 and has yet to issue any to a L3C.340 
The historic confusion about tax treatment of PRIs has led to a reluc-
tance on the part of foundations to actively pursue PRIs for fear of tax 
risks.341 Indeed, such investments may be labeled “jeopardizing” by the IRS 
and incur the corresponding 5% tax on the investment.342 Alternatively, the 
IRS may determine that the entity receiving the PRI does not adequately fur-
ther an exempt purpose. Such an investment would be subject to the Unrelat-
ed Business Income Tax (UBIT) and would incur a corporate income tax on 
the profits earned from any nonexempt business activities.343 Moreover, the 
investment would not count towards the foundation’s 5% distribution re-
quirement,344 and it would also potentially incur a 20% tax on taxable ex-
penditures.345 As a result, many foundations have remained reluctant to dis-
tribute their assets via PRIs and instead opt for the safer course of simply 
distributing assets to charities.346 
In an attempt to encourage foundations to increase their PRIs to social 
enterprises, drafters of L3C statutes transliterated the PRI requirements into 
                                                 
339 See generally I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2006-10-020 (Mar. 10, 2006); see also Klienberger, 
supra note 329, at 892; Murray & Hwang, supra note 325, at 25–26. 
340 As Matthew Doeringer notes, the dearth of Private Letter Rulings in this regard may 
be explained by the fact that the IRS charges $8,700.00 per Private Letter Ruling, and the 
accompanying attorneys fees can be as much as $50,000.00. Moreover, foundations may 
incur additional costs in connection with investment oversight, as the IRS may require 
annual reports confirming the company is using the PRI to further an exempt purpose. 
Doeringer, supra note 254, at 318. 
341 Lauren Burnhill, More PRI Funding for the BOP? Yes – and You Can Help!, CENTER 
FOR FIN. INCLUSION BLOG (May 29, 2012), http://cfi-blog.org/2012/05/29/more-pri-funding
-for-the-bop-yes-and-you-can-help/ (noting that “[f]or fear of endangering their tax status, 
most foundations have exclusively focused on making grants to non-profit organizations”). 
342 See Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1 (1972). 
343 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(2)-1(b) (1960); see also Katz & Page, Role of Social Enterprise, 
supra note 16, at 79 (noting as well that, should a company involve itself in too many unrelat-
ed business activities, it can lose the exemption entirely). 
344 Doeringer, supra note 254, at 318–19. 
345 I.R.C. § 4945(a)(1) (2006). As Callison and Vestal note, there is also a 5% tax on foun-
dation managers, and both taxes increase if the expenditure is not corrected within the statutory 
period. Id. § 4845(a)(2)–(b)(2); see also Callison & Vestal, supra note 330, at 278 n.29. 
346 Jonathan Greenblatt, Opening the Door for Program Related Investments, STAN. SOC. 
INNOVATION REV. BLOG (May 11, 2012), http://www.ssireview.org/blog/entry/opening
_the_door_for_program_related_investments (“PRI’s historically have not been used with 
much frequency because of confusion as to how they work and the high costs associated 
with them.”). 
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the L3C statutes.347 Indeed, L3Cs are required by statute to operate in ac-
cordance with IRS standards for organizations that qualify for PRIs.348 
While these provisions appear to ameliorate the tax risks posed by PRIs and 
give foundations a green light to streamline PRIs into L3Cs free from tax 
concerns, many commentators have criticized this approach as insufficient. 
J. William Callison and Allan W. Vestal emphasize that Congress has 
not amended the IRC’s PRI provisions to explicitly include investments in 
L3Cs,349 and they conclude that “without changes to federal PRI rules, the L3C 
construct has little or no value.”350 Daniel S. Kleinberger has gone so far as to 
suggest that “the ‘L3C’ is an unnecessary and unwise contrivance; its very ex-
istence is inherently misleading.”351 He submits that the statutory restrictions 
placed on L3Cs are already possible under every state’s flexible LLC statutes, 
and that without amendment to the IRC, “L3C legislation does nothing to help 
foundations seeking to assure themselves of PRI treatment.”352 
J. Haskell Murray and Edward I. Hwang concede this point, but they 
counter it by underscoring the fact that an L3C may not abandon its devotion 
to PRI requirements without sacrificing its specialized corporate status.353 
They contend that tax risks to foundations could be “reduced if prescient 
drafting of the foundation-L3C agreement includes a stop-loss provision or 
other reinvestment options upon an L3C cessation.”354 While a properly 
drafted agreement might reduce some tax risks to foundations, the fact re-
mains that without guidance from the IRS, L3Cs do not live up to their pur-
ported ability to streamline the PRI process by providing a reliable PRI re-
ceiver. Tyler acknowledges this uncertainty but argues that L3Cs are not en-
entirely dependent on foundation funding, and that the entity “transcend[s] 
foundation involvement.”355 However, Tyler’s argument for transcendence is 
hard to square with the almost universally PRI-centric arguments made by 
L3C proponents during the legislative process and after its enactment.356 
                                                 
347 Murray & Hwang, supra note 325, at 26–33. 
348 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A)(i) (2012) (requiring that an L3C 
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In response to these critiques, Reps. Aaron Schock (R-IL) and Jared Polis 
(D-CO) introduced the Philanthropic Facilitation Act of 2011 (H.R. 3420) on 
November 14, 2011.357 Notably, the bill sought to amend the IRC’s definition 
of PRIs and provide for administrative review of whether investments qualify 
as PRIs.358 The bill was referred to the House Committee on Ways and 
Means, and it has yet to emerge; nonetheless, its introduction appears to have 
had an impact. In fact, on April 19, 2012, the IRS released a notice of pro-
posed rulemaking regarding PRIs.359 The proposed regulations add nine new 
examples that “illustrate that a wider range of investments qualify as PRIs 
than the range currently presented in § 53.4944-3(b) ... [and] demonstrate that 
a PRI may accomplish a variety of charitable purposes.”360 These examples 
illustrate new PRI principles, to wit: (1) PRIs may be made to activities fur-
thering charitable purposes in foreign countries, (2) PRIs are not limited to 
situations involving economically disadvantaged individuals or deteriorated 
urban areas, (3) a potentially high rate of return on investment does not auto-
matically prevent an investment from being considered a PRI, and (4) PRIs 
can be achieved through a variety of investment instruments, “including loans 
to individuals, tax-exempt organizations and for-profit organizations, and eq-
uity investments in for-profit organizations.”361 Most importantly, the IRS has 
stated that taxpayers may rely on these examples “before these proposed reg-
ulations are finalized.”362 
While the L3C is not explicitly mentioned in the proposed amendments to 
§ 53.4944-3(b), some of the examples do appear to apply to L3Cs. Example 
16 posits a hypothetical in which X, an LLC, purchases coffee from poor 
farmers residing in a developing country.363 Y, a private foundation, makes a 
low-interest loan to X to fund the provision of efficient water, pest and farm 
                                                                                                                         
operation is its use of low-cost foundation capital in a high risk tranche of its structure and 
its ability to allocate risk and reward unevenly over a number of investors, thus ensuring 
some a very safe investment with market return. As is appropriate under the PRI structure, 
foundations would normally be expected to assume the highest risk at very low return, making 
the rest of the investment far more secure.”); see also Klienberger, supra note 329, at 894 n.72 
(identifying the remarks of several legislators focusing on the L3C’s supposed PRI fast track). 
357 The Philanthropic Facilitation Act of 2011, H.R. 3420, 112th Cong. (2011). 
358 Id.; see also Westaway, supra note 26. 
359 Examples of Program-Related Investments, Prop. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 23,429 (Apr. 19, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. 53.4944-3). 
360 Id. at 23,430. 
361 Id. at 23,429–30; see also Anne Field, IRS Rule Could Help the Fledgling L3C Cor-
porate Form, FORBES, May 4, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/annefield/2012/05/04/irs
-rules-could-help-the-fledgling-l3c/. 
362 Examples of Program-Related Investments, Prop. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944, 77 Fed. 
Reg. at 23,429 (Apr. 19, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. 53.4944-3). 
363 Id. at 23,431. 
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management, and crop cultivation.364 Because Y’s primary purpose in mak-
ing the loan is the education of poor farmers, and not the production of in-
come, the loan significantly furthers Y’s exempt activities and qualifies as a 
PRI.365 This example illustrates several principles: first, foundations may 
safely make PRIs to LLCs and, in theory, L3Cs; second, PRIs may be made 
to further educational and environmental purposes; and third, PRIs may be 
made to organizations with operations outside the United States. 
The impact these examples will have on the PRI practices of private 
foundations remains unclear. However, the amendments and accompanying 
principles do address many concerns regarding the tax consequences of 
PRIs and appear to provide assurances for tax treatment of potential invest-
ments. Indeed, these new examples may signal the alignment of substance 
and form and usher in a new era of tranched investments in L3Cs and other 
mission-driven entities. However, such an outcome might also have nega-
tive effects on existing nonprofits, particularly public charities that already 
rely heavily on foundation funding.366 Is social enterprise at the expense of 
traditional charity a desirable outcome?367 This question raises much broad-
er issues that are beyond the scope of this Article, but to the extent the IRS 
has succeeded in alleviating the tax concerns regarding L3Cs and opened 
the floodgates for PRIs, these issues merit a thoughtful discussion. 
Looking beyond the funding issues associated with L3Cs, other com-
mentators have criticized the governance structure of these entities. Some 
scholars have noted that the dual charitable and financial purposes of 
L3Cs “invite an apparent conflict of fiduciary duties”368 and leave direc-
tors with little guidance regarding how to prioritize these duties when con-
fronted with competing financial goals and tax-exempt purposes.369 John 
Tyler dubs this the “problem of two masters” and argues that L3C statutes 
“clearly impose an unambiguous ordering of fiduciary priorities[:] ... the 
theory and purpose of the L3C [is to] prioritize charitable, exempt purpos-
es as a fiduciary matter.”370 Thus, in Tyler’s view, the charitable purpose 
trumps shareholder wealth-maximization, a conclusion that appears consistent 
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with the “low-profit” moniker of the L3C.371 Murray and Hwang share this 
view and argue that fiduciary duties imposed on managers of L3Cs should 
be modeled after the fiduciary duties imposed on nonprofit managers.372 
While this interpretation might provide some guidance at the highest lev-
els of L3C governance, it still leaves much to be desired in the context of 
implementation on a day-to-day basis, and it does not adequately address 
how and to what extent the preeminence of charitable purposes effects di-
rectors’ duties of care and loyalty. Some commentators embrace this ap-
parent conflict and see it as a benefit that encourages “a candid harmoniza-
tion of goals.”373 L3Cs would certainly invite a candid harmonization, but 
legitimate concern regarding the governance of L3Cs and managers’ fidu-
ciary duties may pose another hurdle for L3C proponents, notwithstanding 
any amendment to the IRC. 
In sum, the L3C has been the most widely criticized social enterprise 
entity. However, recent developments appear to address some of the tax 
concerns regarding L3C funding. Despite this progress, legitimate questions 
remain about L3C governance and the fiduciary duties of L3C managers. At 
the moment, the L3C may be the right choice of entity for some social en-
trepreneurs with foundation support, but it is likely burdened by too much 
uncertainty for many aspiring social entrepreneurs. 
C. Flexible Purpose Corporations 
October 9, 2011 was a landmark day for emerging corporate entities in 
California. On that day, Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. signed two bills 
into law: first, AB 361,374 which made California the sixth state to author-
ize the benefit corporation,375 and second, SB 201, also known as the Cor-
porate Flexibility Act of 2011.376 The latter provided for a new type of 
                                                 
371 Id.; see also Murray & Hwang, supra note 325, at 40 (“The PRI requirements built 
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When the profit master and the charitable purpose master irreconcilably conflict in the 
operation of an L3C, however, the charitable purpose master must rule.”). 
372 Murray & Hwang, supra note 325, at 41. Conversely, the authors argue that 
enforcement of those duties should resemble for-profit enforcement mechanisms, including 
affording directors of L3Cs the protection of the business judgment rule. Id. 
373 LANE, supra note 330, at 42. 
374 See Complete Bill History of AB 361, OFFICIAL CAL. LEGIS. INFO., http://www.leg
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corporate entity—namely, the flexible purpose corporation (FPC).377 This 
Section explores the governance structure and the liabilities associated with 
this new entity. 
An FPC may be either publicly traded or closely held,378 and it is re-
quired to include the words “flexible purpose corporation” or “FPC” in its 
name.379 Its articles of incorporation must include a statement enumerating 
the purposes of the FPC.380 Importantly, a FPC must be organized for one 
or more of the following purposes: (1) charitable purposes like those non-
profits carry out;381 or (2) promoting positive short-term or long-term ef-
fects or minimizing adverse short-term or long-term effects of the FPC’s 
activities on its “employees, suppliers, customers, and creditors,” “the 
community and society,” and “the environment.”382 These two broadly de-
fined categories offer an FPC substantial discretion to select its blended val-
ue purpose and enshrine the hallmark flexibility of this entity in its articles 
of incorporation. 
In addition to the mandatory provisions discussed above, a FPC’s arti-
cles of incorporation may also include several discretionary provisions. 
Some of these include setting forth special qualifications for sharehold-
ers,383 setting forth a termination date for the FPC,384 restricting the business 
in which the FPC engages in,385 or requiring a vote of a larger proportion or 
of all the shares of any class or series before the FPC takes “any or all corpo-
rate actions.”386 The articles may also limit the liability of directors for money 
damages in actions brought by the FPC or derivative actions brought by 
shareholders for breach of directorial duties.387 However, these discretionary 
limits on liability are subject to numerous exceptions388 and are only available 
for directors, not officers, of the FPC.389 
                                                 
377 Id. 
378 Id. § 2503.1. Additionally, FPCs may engage in a wide range of business activities, 
commercial or industrial banking, the trust business, or the title insurance business, 
subject to the applicable provisions of the California Financial Code. Id. § 2510. 
379 Id. § 2602(a). 
380 Id. § 2602(b)(1). 
381 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602(b)(2)(A) (West 2011). 
382 Id. § 2602(b)(2)(B)(i)–(iii). 
383 Id. § 2603(a)(3). 
384 Id. § 2603(a)(4). 
385 Id. § 2603(a)(6). 
386 Id. § 2603(a)(5). 
387 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2603(a)(10) (West 2011). 
388 See id. § 2603(a)(10)(A)–(B). 
389 Id. § 2603(a)(10)(C). 
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Thus, the corporate purpose provisions of the FPC’s authorization stat-
ute requires the founders to select at least one charitable, social, or envi-
ronmental purpose.390 The FPC, like the L3C, may be created for primarily 
charitable purposes. The main difference, however, is that where the L3C 
is designed to receive PRIs from foundations, the FPC is designed to raise 
equity capital.391 Note that nowhere in the FPC statute will one find the 
term “low-profit,” nor is there a prohibition or cap on dividends, thus mak-
ing it more appealing to a broader group of investors. In other words, an 
FPC created for a charitable or environmental purpose392 would arguably 
qualify for a PRI under the proposed IRS regulations discussed above, but 
it may also raise equity capital from socially responsible investors. Thus, 
the FPC represents a truly blended corporate form, where the articles of 
incorporation enshrine both profit motive and social and environmental 
benefits as corporate purposes. 
With respect to fiduciary duties, FPC directors are generally obligated to 
perform their duties in good faith and with reasonable care “in a manner the 
director believes to be in the best interests of the flexible purpose corporation 
and its shareholders.”393 In discharging those duties, directors may consider 
and give weight to factors the director deems relevant, including the “short-
term and long-term prospects of the flexible purpose corporation, the best in-
terests of the flexible purpose corporation and its shareholders,” and the social 
or environmental interests set forth in the articles of incorporation.394 Direc-
tors are insulated from liability based upon any alleged failure to act,395 and 
stakeholders are explicitly denied a right of action against directors.396 
However, creditors and shareholders are given some limited rights of 
action against the FPC and its directors, although the extent of liability in 
these cases may be capped or subject to indemnification by the FPC. Sec-
tion 2701 provides limited rights of action for creditors or shareholders of 
the FPC.397 A director may also be liable to creditors for distributing assets 
                                                 
390 Id. § 2602(b)(2)(A), (B)(i)–(iii). 
391 See SUSAN H. MAC CORMAC, NEW CORPORATE Forms: FLEXIBLE PURPOSE 
CORPORATIONS, BENEFIT CORPORATIONS, AND L3CS, (Berkeley Ctr. for Law, Bus. & Econ., 
Berkeley, Cal., Nov. 8, 2011), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/bclbe/Berkeley
_Handout_1182011_-_1.pdf. 
392 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602(b)(2)(A) (West 2011). 
393 Id. § 2700(a). 
394 Id. § 2700(c). 
395 Id. § 2700(d). 
396 Id. § 2700(f). 
397 Id. § 2701(a). For example, a director may be liable to shareholders for making any 
distribution to the shareholders contrary to sections 500 to 503 of the California Corporate 
Code. Id. § 2701(c)(1). 
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to shareholders after the institution of dissolution proceedings.398 Moreover, 
directors who abstain from voting are deemed to have approved the decision 
and do not escape liability for the aforementioned actions.399 However, even 
the minimal FPC director liability can effectively be circumvented by virtue 
of capping damages and indemnification provisions.400 
Accountability of the FPC to its blended corporate purposes is addressed 
in its unique reporting requirements. FPC’s are required to issue “annual re-
ports,”401 which must be sent to the shareholders and also be made publicly 
available on the FPC’s website.402 The statute requires the annual reports to 
include an end-of-year balance sheet and a management discussion and anal-
ysis (MD&A) of issues such as the short-term and long-term objectives of the 
FPC relating to its specific purpose(s) and the effectiveness of the material 
actions taken to achieve those purposes.403 In addition to this annual reporting 
requirement, FPCs are also required to issue a “special purpose current re-
port” to the shareholders and the public within forty-five days of a material 
action or expenditure related to the FPCs specific purposes.404 These special 
purpose reports are designed to ensure FPCs transparency to the shareholders 
and the public by identifying and discussing all material expenditures made in 
furtherance of the FPC’s special purposes. 
The FPC model, however, is not without problems. The corporate pur-
pose categories are certainly flexible, but they may be so broadly drafted that 
they risk losing all meaning. This problem is exacerbated by the two-level 
reporting structure, which imposes added costs on the FPC without requiring 
that the reports be assessed against an independent third-party standard. As 
discussed above, this leaves open the possibility of manipulating reported da-
ta to the FPC’s advantage while its directors simultaneously benefit from ex-
pansive liability protections.405 This point is driven home when one considers 
that the board of directors is given sole discretion to determine what infor-
mation to include in the annual and special purpose reports.406 
                                                 
398 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2701(c)(2) (West 2011). 
399 Id. § 2701(b). 
400 Damages obtained from directors in these actions are capped at the amount of the 
illegal distribution, or the fair market value of the property at the time of the illegal distribu-
tion, plus interest. Id. § 2701(d). Furthermore, a FPC may elect to indemnify any director 
from any and all claims pursuant to section 2702(b). Id. § 2702(b). 
401 Id. § 3500. 
402 CAL. CORP. CODE § 3500(b) (West 2011). 
403 Id. § 3500(b)(1)–(5). 
404 Id. § 3501. 
405 See, e.g., id. § 3502(a) (conferring discretion on both management and the board when 
providing the information required by section 3501). 
406 Id. 
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The broad limitations on liability also present the problem of accountabil-
ity to the FPC’s stated social or environmental purposes. As R. Todd John-
son, energy practice leader at Jones Day’s Silicon Valley office, has noted, 
the FPC “seeks to unleash directors from the risk of liability, permitting them 
to experiment more broadly with the right mix of doing well and doing good, 
without concerns of personal or corporate suits.”407 However, it is unclear 
whether this experiment will serve the needs of the social enterprise move-
ment. Curiously, the FPC employs a combination of unchecked directorial 
power and lack of standardized and independent reporting requirements, 
which have historically been poor bedfellows for social and environmental 
progress. The FPC’s lack of accountability and specificity may, in turn, create 
the impression amongst socially responsible investors that FPCs lack legiti-
macy. In sum, the FPC may live up to its name as a genuinely “flexible” pur-
pose corporation in the context of director liability and blended corporate 
purpose, but the potential for abuse, along with onerous reporting require-
ments, does little to contribute to the development of social enterprise law. 
D. Social Purpose Corporations 
On March 30, 2012, three months after its introduction,408 Washington 
Governor Chris Gregoire signed Substitute House Bill 2239 (SHB 2239) 
into law, which authorized the creation of yet another entity, the social pur-
pose corporation (SPC).409 SPCs, much like FPCs, must include a corporate 
purpose statement in their articles of incorporation. All SPCs must be orga-
nized as follows: “[I]n a manner intended to promote positive short-term or 
long-term effects of, or minimize adverse short-term or long-term effects of, the 
corporation’s activities upon any or all of (1) the corporation’s employees, 
suppliers, or customers; (2) the local, state, national, or world community; or 
                                                 
407 R. Todd Johnson, The Benefit Corporation: A Step in the Right Direction, but ..., 
BUS. FOR GOOD (June 12, 2010, 12:01 PM), http://businessforgood.blogspot.com/2010/06
/benefit-corporation-step-in-right.html. 
408 House Bill 2239 (HB 2239) was introduced into the Washington State House of 
Representatives on January 10, 2012. A companion bill, Senate Bill 6230 (SB 6230), was 
introduced on February 15, 2012 in the Washington State Senate. Both bills were quickly 
voted through their respective houses. On February 13, 2012, HB 2239 passed in the House 
with a vote of 62 yeas, 31 nays, and 5 excused; on March 2, 2012, SB 6230 passed in the 
Senate with a vote of 34 yeas, 14 nays, and 1 excused. See H.B. 2239 Establishing Social 
Purpose Corporations: History of the Bill, WASH. ST. LEG., http://apps.leg.wa.gov/billinfo
/summary.aspx?bill=2239&year=2011 (last updated Mar. 5, 2013). 
409 See S.H.B. 2239, § 1, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012), available at http://apps
.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2011-12/Pdf/Bills/House%20Passed%20Legislature/223
9-S.PL.pdf. 
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(3) the environment.”410 This language is similar to the FPC requirement; 
however, the category of “charitable purposes” is notably absent. SPCs are 
also given the option to select one or more “specific social purposes,” alt-
hough the bill does not provide a list of examples of such purposes.411 
Existing organizations may convert to SPC status,412 provided they 
amend their articles of incorporation to include the following: (i) a state-
ment that the corporation is a social purpose corporation; (ii) a statement 
setting forth the general social purpose and specific social purposes, if any; 
and (iii) the following mission statement: “The mission of this social pur-
pose corporation is not necessarily compatible with and may be contrary to 
maximizing profits and earnings for shareholders, or maximizing share-
holder value in any sale, merger, acquisition, or other similar actions of the 
corporation.”413 These requirements, along with the mandate that a SPC in-
clude the term “social purpose corporation” or “SPC” in its name,414 serve to 
put any potential investors on notice that the SPC is an entity that may subro-
gate shareholder value in favor of social or environmental interests. In contrast 
with the L3C, where charitable purpose arguably overrides profit maximiza-
tion, the SPC takes a more flexible approach by giving directors the discretion 
to choose social and environmental purposes over profits in all circumstances. 
The statute also includes provisions designed to ensure that SPCs retain 
their general and specific social purposes. For example, in the event an 
amendment to the articles of incorporation is proposed that would materially 
alter one or more of the SPC’s social purposes, the bill requires a minimum of 
a two-thirds majority to pass the amendment.415 The same applies to situa-
tions in which the SPC is involved in a merger or transaction in which it is not 
the surviving corporation or one that will dispose of all or substantially all of 
its assets.416 In the event such votes succeed, the shareholders of an SPC are 
entitled to dissent and obtain a fair market buyout of their shares.417 
SPC directors also enjoy limited liability. Directors are shielded from li-
ability against derivative actions for failure to maximize shareholder value 
                                                 
410 Id. § 3. 
411 Id. § 4. 
412 Id. § 14 (permitting any corporation that is not a SPC to become a SPC, subject to 
conditions set forth in § 14(1)(a)–(c)). 
413 Id. §§ 5(1)(b)–(e), 14(3) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
414 Id. § 5(1)(a). 
415 S.H.B. 2239, § 10, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012), available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov
/documents/billdocs/2011-12/Pdf/Bills/House%20Passed%20Legislature/2239-S.PL.pdf 
(providing in addition that an SPC may require a greater vote in its articles of incorporation). 
416 Id. §§ 11–12. 
417 Id. § 13(2)–(3). 
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by virtue of the mission statement discussed above.418 The statute gives di-
rectors the discretion to “consider and give weight to one or more of the so-
cial purposes of the corporation as the director deems relevant,”419 and it 
provides that any directorial action or failure to act “shall be deemed to be 
in the best interests of the corporation” so long as the director reasonably 
believes the action “is intended to promote one or more of the social pur-
poses of the corporation.”420 The statute also denies stakeholders a right of 
action against directors and officers of SPCs.421 
Transparency of SPCs is addressed by requiring them to submit a “so-
cial purpose report” to the shareholders and to make the report publicly 
available on its website.422 The social purpose report is required to include 
a “narrative discussion” regarding the social purposes of the SPC, includ-
ing its efforts to promote its social purpose.423 Additionally, the report 
may include a discussion of the SPC’s short-term and long-term objec-
tives, any “material actions taken by the corporation during the fiscal year 
to achieve its social purpose or purposes,” and “[a] description of the fi-
nancial, operating, or other measures” employed by the SPC for evaluating 
its social performance.424 Washington Superior Courts are vested with the 
authority to order a social purpose report be furnished to the shareholders 
if appropriate notice has been given and the SPC has failed to issue a re-
port for at least two consecutive fiscal years.425 
While the intent behind the social purpose reporting requirement is 
laudable, the bill does not require that these reports be assessed against in-
dependent third-party standards. As a result, SPCs, like FPCs, are held to no 
higher a standard than CR reporting, leaving investors in the familiar situa-
tion of relying on voluntarily disclosed, unregulated reports assessed against 
unstandardized methodologies.426 This risks leaving SPCs and FPCs unac-
countable for their blended value goals. However, the SPC’s distinctly anti-
Revlon, anti-shareholder wealth maximization mission statement is a nota-
ble development in social enterprise law. Stronger reporting requirements 
can be found in benefit corporation statutes, the topic of the next Section. 
                                                 
418 See id. § 6. 
419 Id. § 6(2). 
420 Id. § 6(3). 
421 S.H.B. 2239, § 6(4)–(5), 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012), available at http://
apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2011-12/Pdf/Bills/House%20Passed%20Legislature/
2239-S.PL.pdf. 
422 Id. § 16(1). 
423 Id. § 16(2). 
424 Id. 
425 Id. § 16(5). 
426 See supra Part II.B. 
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E. Benefit Corporations 
1. Distinguishing “B Corporations” from Benefit Corporations 
The benefit corporation has been called the “most ascendant social en-
terprise innovation today.”427 Like other emerging entities, benefit corpora-
tions aim to accommodate both social and financial goals by increasing the 
board’s discretion to take social and environmental goals into account when 
making business decisions.428 At the time of this writing, benefit corporations 
have been enacted in twelve states and the District of Columbia,429 and legis-
lation is currently under consideration in several more jurisdictions.430 
The success of the benefit corporation is due in large part to the lobby-
ing efforts of B Labs, a nonprofit organization dedicated to supporting busi-
ness vehicles for “entrepreneurs and investors seeking to use business to 
solve social and environmental problems.”431 In addition to supporting ben-
efit corporation legislation, B Labs has created its own private certification 
for “B Corporations.”432 As of March 2013, B Labs has certified 693 B Cor-
porations spanning across sixty industries.433 
There is a crucial distinction between “B Corporations” and benefit cor-
porations. B Labs certifies existing organizations that wish to brand them-
selves as “B Corporations.”434 In contrast, benefit corporations are new 
corporate entities authorized under state corporate law. 
                                                 
427 Munch, supra note 78, at 171. 
428 William H. Clark, Jr. & Larry Vranka, The Need and Rationale for the Benefit Cor
poration: Why It Is the Legal Form That Best Addresses the Needs of Social Entrepre-
neurs, Investors, and, Ultimately, the Public 1 (Jan. 26, 2012), available at http://benefit
corp.net/storage/documents/The_Need_and_Rationale_for_Benefit_Corporations_April
_2012.pdf. 
429 California, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New 
York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia have all passed Benefit 
Corporation legislation. See State by State Legislative Status, BENEFIT CORP INFO. CENTER, 
http://www.benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
430 Legislatures in Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Montana, 
Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, and West Virginia are con-
sidering bills to authorize benefit corporations. See id. The District of Columbia intro-
duced benefit corporation legislation on November 15, 2011. See id.; Benefit Corporation 
Act of 2011, COUNCIL OF D.C., http://dcclims1.dccouncil.us/lims/legislation.aspx?LegNo
=B19-0584 (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
431 The Nonprofit Behind B Corps, B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b
-corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corps (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
432 Fei, supra note 24, at 41. 
433 B CORPORATION, http://www.bcorporation.net (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
434 Fei, supra note 24, at 41–42. 
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Organizations seeking a “B Corporation” certification must first take a 
“B Impact Assessment,” pass an assessment review,435 submit required 
documentation and adopt B Labs’ amendments to their articles of incorpora-
tion,436 and pay B Labs a certification fee.437 Once the process is complete, 
B Labs certifies that the corporation is a “B Corporation,” at which point it 
is subject to B Labs’s private regulatory regime that includes randomly se-
lected on-site reviews.438 Additionally, B Corporations are required to pre-
pare an annual public interest report that evaluates its progress in meeting its 
stated goals.439 
Because it is self-imposed and privately regulated, B Corporation cer-
tification does not offer any special tax treatment.440 Moreover, it fails to 
grant stakeholders a right of action against the B Corporation to enforce 
the mandate that directors consider stakeholder interests when making 
business decisions.441 Dana Brakman Reiser opines that shareholders who 
invest in a B Corporation because of its social and environmental com-
mitments could serve as a proxy for stakeholder constituencies, but ulti-
mately concludes that B Corporation certification “realistically offers only 
moral, rather than legal, assurances to non-shareholder constituencies and 
social interests.”442 Therefore, Reiser argues, its most important aspect is 
its branding value.443 Because B Corporations are subject to a private 
regulatory system, their branding value will be determined by the effec-
tiveness of the regulation. The extent to which the B Corporation brand 
succeeds with benefit corporations and the other entities discussed infra, 
however, remains to be seen. 
                                                 
435 How to Become a B Corp, B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp
/how-to-become-a-b-corp (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
436 See Protect Your Mission, B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp
/how-to-become-a-b-corp/protect-your-mission (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (providing a 
link to a portion of the site that contains step-by-step instructions, depending on an entity’s 
current legal form); cf. Steven J. Haymore, Note, Public(ly Oriented) Companies: B 
Corporations and the Delaware Stakeholder Provision Dilemma, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1331, 
1323 (2011) (arguing that B Corporations’ future may depend on the compatibility of B 
Labs’ stakeholder charter provision with Delaware corporate law). 
437 Make It Official, B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/how-to
-become-a-b-corp/120 (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
438 Id. 
439 Id. 
440 Reiser, supra note 265, at 637. 
441 Id. at 640–41. 
442 Id. at 641–42. 
443 See id. at 643; see also Kelley, supra note 7, at 367 (“[T]he primary benefit of the B 
designation will be to create a brand for corporations that are truly and fundamentally 
committed to socially beneficial outcomes.”). 
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2. The Benefit Corporation at a Glance 
Thus far, California,444 Hawaii,445 Illionois,446 Louisiana,447 Maryland,448 
Massachusetts,449 New Jersey,450 New York,451 Pennsylvania,452 South Caro-
lina,453 Vermont,454 Virginia,455 and the District of Columbia456 have enacted 
benefit corporation legislation. All benefit corporation statutes are structured 
around four main headings: (1) general provisions, (2) corporate purpose, 
(3) accountability, and (4) transparency.457 This Section identifies three fun-
damental aspects of benefit corporations and then highlights some notable 
features specific to certain jurisdictions. 
a. Corporate Purpose: Creating General and Specific Public Benefits 
Every benefit corporation statute requires that the articles of incorpora-
tion include language explaining that the benefit corporation “shall have the 
purpose of creating a general public benefit”458 and permits benefit corpora-
tions to specify one or more “specific public benefits.”459 “General public 
benefit” is defined as a “material positive impact on society and the envi-
ronment,” measured “against a third-party standard, from the business and 
                                                 
444 See generally CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14600–14631 (West 2012). 
445 See generally HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 420D-1 to -13 (2012). Hawaii’s statute uses the 
term “sustainable business corporation” instead of the “benefit corporation.” Id. § 420D-2. 
Unlike the other emerging corporate entities discussed in Parts III.B and III.C, above, 
however, this appears to be a distinction without a difference. 
446 S.B. 2897, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2012) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
447 See generally Benefit Corporations, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1801–1832 (2012). 
448 See generally MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 5-6C-01 to 5-6C-08 (LexisNexis 2012). 
449 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 238, § 52 (2012). 
450 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:18-1 to -11 (West 2012). 
451 N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1701–1709 (McKinney 2012). 
452 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3301–3331 (2012). 
453 See H. 4766, 119th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2012) (amending Title 33 of the 1976 Code 
by adding Chapter 38, entitled “South Carolina Benefit Corporation Act”). 
454 See generally VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §§ 21.01–21.14 (2012). 
455 See generally VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-782 to -791 (2012). 
456 D.C. CODE § 29-1301 to -1304 (2013). The District of Columbia approved Bill No. 
B19-584 in December 2012 and the bill was sent to the Mayor. The Mayoral Review End 
Date is February 11, 2013, at which point the bill is subject to the thirty-day period of 
Congressional review as provided by the District of Columbia Home Rule Act, D.C. CODE 
§ 1-206.02(c)(1) (2012). Thus, the tentative effective date of the D.C. Benefit Corporation 
Act of 2011 is March 13, 2013. See Legislation, COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 
http://dcclims1.dccouncil.us/lims/searchbylegislation.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
457 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14600–14631 (West 2012). 
458 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-5(a) (West 2012). 
459 Id. § 14A:18-5(b). 
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operations of a benefit corporation.”460 While the exact meaning of this def-
inition has not been addressed by the courts, a notable inclusion is the refer-
ence to a third-party standard, which attempts to address concerns regarding 
reporting accountability and methodology. 
All benefit corporation statutes also define the term “specific public 
benefit” by listing the following examples: 
(1) Providing low-income or underserved individuals or communities 
with beneficial products or services; 
(2) Promoting economic opportunity for individuals or communities be-
yond the creation of jobs in the normal course of business; 
(3) Preserving or improving the environment; 
(4) Improving human health; 
(5) Promoting the arts, sciences, or advancement of knowledge; 
(6) Increasing the flow of capital to entities with a public benefit purpose; and 
(7) Conferring any other particular benefit on society or the environment.461 
These examples provide much-needed specificity to both directors and 
investors, and their wide range reflects the expansive American view of social 
enterprise. Indeed, each list ends with a catch-all provision462 that encourages 
the innovation of new or more specific public benefits. More importantly, as 
William Clark and Elizabeth Babson note, in treating general and specific 
public benefits separately, the statutes ensure that benefit corporations “can 
pursue any specific mission, but that the company as a whole is also working 
toward general public benefit.”463 
The statutes also contain provisions designed to ensure benefit corpora-
tions retain their unique corporate purpose. For example, the Vermont statute 
requires that the board of directors provide a statement of reasons why it is 
proposing a merger or sale in which the surviving corporation is not a bene-
fit corporation.464 Furthermore, many statutes require that a merger or sale 
must be approved by, at minimum, a two-thirds vote, or a greater voting 
                                                 
460 N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1702(b) (McKinney 2012). Note, however, that the defini-
tion of “general public benefit” contained in the New Jersey statute does not include a refer-
ence to a “third-party standard,” although it does require that the annual benefit report be 
prepared in accordance with a third-party standard. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11(2). 
461 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782 (2012). The Louisiana statute contains slightly differ-
ent language regarding specific environmental benefits, to wit: “[p]reserving the environ-
ment, promoting positive impacts on the environment, or reducing negative impacts on the 
environment.” Benefit Corporations, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1803(A)(10)(c) (2012). 
462 Id. § 13.1-782(7). 
463 Clark & Babson, supra note 14, at 841 (noting that this ostensibly ensures that benefit 
corporations are not, for example, seeking to reduce waste while increasing carbon emissions). 
464 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.06(a)(1) (2012). 
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share as required by the articles of incorporation.465 The same two-thirds 
voting requirement is also applicable to amendments to the corporate pur-
poses contained in the articles of incorporation, even where the benefit 
corporation would retain its social enterprise status.466 These provisions do 
not rise to the level of “asset locks,” as it is still possible to overcome the-
se protections and transfer a benefit corporation’s assets to a for-profit or-
ganization. However, these heightened requirements may deter potential hos-
tile takeovers or mergers that would separate a benefit corporation’s assets 
from its stated social or environmental purposes. 
b. Accountability: The Duty to Consider Stakeholder Interests 
All benefit corporation statutes also impose an additional duty on di-
rectors. In addition to the traditional duty to create value for shareholders, 
directors of benefit corporations are also under a duty to consider the ef-
fects of their business decisions upon stakeholder groups.467 These stake-
holders include the following: 
(2) The employees and workforce of the benefit corporations and its sub-
sidiaries and suppliers; 
(3) The interests of customers of the benefit corporation as beneficiaries of 
the general or specific public benefit purposes of the benefit corporation; 
(4) Community and societal considerations, including those of any com-
munity in which offices or facilities of the benefit corporation or its sub-
sidiaries or suppliers are located; 
(5) The local and global environment; 
(6) The short-term and long-term interests of the benefit corporation ...; and 
(7) The ability of the benefit corporation to accomplish its general, and any 
specific, public benefit purpose.468 
While this list is instructive, it does not provide directors with any particu-
lar hierarchy by which to evaluate each of these interests.469 In fact, most 
                                                 
465 Id. § 21.06(a)(2). 
466 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 14610(d) (West 2012). 
467 See, e.g., id. § 14620(b). 
468 CAL. CORP. CODE § 14620(b)(2)–(7). Note however that the Hawaii statute only re-
quires that directors consider the effects of any action on the shareholders and the “accom-
plishment of general and specific public benefits” of the sustainable business corporation, 
and gives directors the discretion for, but does not require, consideration of the six groups 
of stakeholder interest. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-6(1)(2)(A)–(H) (2012). Additionally, 
the phrase “the short-term and long-term interests of the benefit corporation” is not included 
among the list in the Maryland statute. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-07 
(LexisNexis 2012). 
469 This has been criticized by some commentators as inviting conflicts and confusion as 
to how directors should make business decisions. See Cummings, supra note 26, at 606. 
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benefit corporation statutes explicitly provide that directors are not required to 
give priority to any particular group over any other, unless otherwise stated in 
the articles of incorporation,470 leaving directors a large degree of flexibility 
in this respect. Additionally, directors of benefit corporations are shielded 
from liability to the stakeholders whose interests they are obliged to consider. 
Most benefit corporation statutes provide that directors have no fiduciary du-
ties to stakeholders, and in this regard they are similar to those of the afore-
mentioned FPC and SPC.471 However, shareholders of benefit corporations 
are given an expanded right of action to enforce this additional duty to con-
sider stakeholder interests.472 
Thus, the benefit corporation relies on shareholders to act as proxies for 
stakeholder groups to ensure compliance with the stated social and environ-
mental purposes of the organization.473 Additionally, the statutes permit benefit 
corporations to privilege one or more specific public benefits above others,474 
and to grant specific stakeholder groups with a right of action designed to en-
sure that the directors fulfill their duty to consider stakeholder interests. 
c. Transparency: The Annual Benefit Report 
The third fundamental element of benefit corporation statutes is the 
annual benefit report (ABR). In all states, benefit corporations are required 
to submit an ABR to each shareholder475 and, in most cases, to make the 
                                                 
470 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 14620(d); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1707(a)(3) 
(McKinney 2012). 
471 See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1707(c); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09(e) (2012). 
472 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.13 (giving shareholders a right of action to 
pursue benefit enforcement proceedings, including claims that directors violated their 
statutory standard of conduct, which includes giving sufficient consideration to stake-
holder interests). 
473 Robert A. Wexler & David A. Levitt, Using New Hybrid Legal Forms: Three Case 
Studies, Four Important Questions, and a Bunch of Analysis, 69 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 
64, 70 (2012), http://www.adlercolvin.com/pdf/hybrid.pdf (“[A]n alternative corporate form 
makes sense if the founders want the corporation’s board to be free to consider, on a 
regular and unlimited basis, a social or charitable mission, without concern about failure 
to maximize profits.”). 
474 See J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications 
and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript 
at 30), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2115548_code1
725837.pdf?abstractid=2085000&mirid=1 (noting however, that directors may not pursue 
a special purpose at the expense of the general public purpose). 
475 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 14630; HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-11 (2012); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 14A:18-11 (West 2012); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1708; MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & 
ASS’NS § 5-6C-08 (LexisNexis 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-791 (2012); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 11A, § 21.14. 
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most recent ABR publicly available on its website.476 The ABR must be 
measured against some independent, third party standard477 chosen by the 
board. In general, ABRs must include a narrative description of: (1) the ways 
in which the benefit corporation pursued both its general and any specific 
public benefits during the year, (2) any circumstances that have hindered the 
creation of general or specific public benefits, and (3) an assessment of the 
social and environmental performance of the benefit corporation.478 
The independent standard plays an important role in adding legitimacy 
to the benefit corporation’s stated purposes. The drafters took great care to 
define “third party standard” to prevent the inherent conflict of interests that 
arise when corporations promulgate their own standards or use malleable 
industry-friendly standards. The New York statute uses the most common 
definition of “third-party standard,” to wit: 
[A] recognized standard for defining, reporting and assessing general 
public benefit that is: 
(1) developed by a person that is independent of the benefit corporation; and 
(2) transparent because the following information about the standard is 
publicly available: 
(A) the factors considered when measuring the performance of a business; 
(B) the relative weightings of those factors; and 
(C) the identity of the persons who developed and control changes to the 
standard and the process by which those changes are made.479 
Thus, the third-party standard requirement goes to great lengths to ensure 
that the standard-setters are truly independent of the benefit corporation 
and its interests. 
However, some commentators have criticized this approach, emphasiz-
ing that the statutes lack verification requirements and rely on self-reporting.480 
Some have argued that this “presents a clear opportunity for selective re-
porting, if not outright misconduct.”481 Steven Munch suggests that future 
legislation should outline specific penalties for directors who “provide false 
                                                 
476 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11(c); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-791(C). 
477 See supra note 460 and accompanying text. 
478 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-08(a). 
479 N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1702(g). The statutes in Vermont, Virginia, Maryland, 
and New Jersey contain the same definition. 
480 Gupta, supra note 366, at 224 (questioning whether the third-party evaluations are 
rigorous enough and whether self-evaluations pose risks of dishonest reporting); see also 
Cummings, supra note 26, at 580, 611–13. The Vermont statute stands alone in vesting 
benefit directors with the authority to retain an independent third party to audit the annual 
benefit report or conduct social and environmental performance assessments. VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.10(c)(2). 
481 Munch, supra note 78, at 194. 
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or misleading information on the company’s social performance.”482 William 
H. Clark, Jr., one of the drafters of benefit corporation legislation, counters 
with several reasons for not mandating verification of ABRs. First, he notes 
that doing so would impose additional costs on benefit corporations.483 Se-
cond, he argues that for-profit corporations are not required to have audited 
financial reports, and by analogy, benefit corporations should not be required 
to have audited ABRs.484 Clark addresses Munch’s concerns by noting that 
directors of benefit corporations are already subject to suit for fraud if they 
report false or misleading information in their benefit reports.485 He also ar-
gues that discretionary verification should remain available to certain benefit 
corporations who wish to distinguish themselves and attract greater confi-
dence in their social and environmental claims.486 
Clark offers persuasive arguments against mandatory verification, but 
that is not the only critique leveled at benefit corporations’ reporting re-
quirements. For instance, the statutes do not provide any baseline for so-
cial or environmental performance, nor do they prescribe any particular 
methodology or require a specific valuation metric against which a benefit 
corporation’s social and environmental performance should be assessed. 
Clark responds by noting that unlike financial metrics, reliable industry 
standards for measuring social and environmental performance do not ex-
ist, but “[p]resumably, armed with the information included in the annual 
benefit report and the statutory requirements with respect to a third-party 
standard, market forces will shape the landscape of third-party standards 
utilized by benefit corporations.”487 Although this approach stands in stark 
contrast to CR reporting, the effectiveness of this particular mixture of 
third-party standards without verification or baselines remains to be seen. 
d. Variations in the Statutes 
In his dissenting opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,488 Justice 
Louis Brandeis famously observed that “[i]t is one of the happy incidents of 
the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, 
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without 
risk to the rest of the country.”489 Legislatures in several states have served as 
                                                 
482 Id. 
483 Clark & Babson, supra note 14, at 846. 
484 Id. at 847. 
485 Id. 
486 Id. 
487 Id. at 846. 
488 285 U.S. 262, 280 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
489 Id. at 311. 
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laboratories for benefit corporation legislation, and it comes as no surprise 
that states continue to build upon previous legislation by introducing unique 
provisions for their respective corporate codes. In an effort to provide a deep-
er understanding of this quickly developing legal landscape, this Section iden-
tifies several variations and unique features of benefit corporation statutes. 
The Benefit Director. Eight states—Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, New 
Jersey, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Vermont—and 
the District of Columbia have adopted the requirement that benefit corpora-
tions designate an independent “benefit director” to sit on the board.490 The-
se provisions largely mirror each other.491 In general, the benefit director 
has all the “powers, duties, rights, and immunities of the other directors of 
the benefit corporation,”492 and is elected and may be removed by the same 
procedures applicable to other directors.493 The benefit director’s primary 
responsibility is preparing the ABR.494 All nine jurisdictions require benefit 
directors to include statements in the ABR addressing whether the benefit 
corporation fulfilled its general and specific goals, whether the directors and 
officers acted in accordance with their duty to consider stakeholder inter-
ests, and, if the benefit corporation failed in either of these two respects, a 
description of those failures.495 Much like the other directors, benefit direc-
tors are shielded from personal liability “for any act or omission taken in his 
or her official capacity.”496 
Benefit Officers. The same nine jurisdictions also permit the selection of 
a “benefit officer.”497 Unlike benefit directors, however, the selection of a 
                                                 
490 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-7 (2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1822(A) (2012); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-7 (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-410(A) (2012); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.10 (2012). 
491 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-7; D.C. CODE § 29-1303.2 (2013). 
492 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1822. 
493 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-7(b); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1822(B); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 14A:18-7(b); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-410(A); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.10(b). 
494 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-7(c); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1822(C); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 14A:18-7; S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-410(C); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.10(c)(1). 
495 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-7(c); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.10(c)(3)–(4). 
496 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-7(e); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.10(f). These 
statutes contain the usual exceptions for “intentional misconduct,” “a knowing violation of 
[the] law,” and “self-dealing.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-7(e); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, 
§ 21.10(f); S.B. 2897, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2012) (effective Jan. 1, 2013); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 238, § 52.11(a) (2012); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3322(a) (2012). 
497 HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-9(a); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1824(A); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 14A:18-9; S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-430(A); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.12; S.B. 2897, 
97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2012) (effective Jan. 1, 2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
238, § 52.11(a); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3322(a). 
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benefit officer is left to the board’s discretion.498 Benefit corporations may 
have an independent benefit officer specifically charged with the manage-
ment of the benefit corporation relating to the creation of the general or spe-
cific public benefits.499 In almost all cases, when a benefit officer is select-
ed, he or she bears the statutory responsibility for preparing the ABR.500 
The California and Virginia statutes do not expressly authorize the 
benefit officer position. However, in most cases,501 regardless of designa-
tion, officers of benefit corporations enjoy the same duties, rights, privi-
leges, and immunities as directors. For example, the Virginia statute con-
tains a general provision stating that officers “shall have no liability” for 
actions taken that the officer believes, in his “good faith business judg-
ment,” agree with the general or specific public benefits of the corporation 
and are consistent with any third-party standards then in effect.502 Other 
states, like California, Vermont, and New Jersey, include more detailed 
officer liability provisions. These states require each officer of a benefit 
corporation to consider both shareholder and stakeholder interests when 
(1) “[t]he officer has discretion to act with respect to a matter” or (2) it 
reasonably appears that the matter “may have a material effect” on the 
creation of general or specific public benefits or any stakeholder inter-
ests.503 Thus officers, as well as directors, are under an additional duty to 
consider stakeholder interests, but they are shielded from liability in deci-
sion-making circumstances.504 
                                                 
498 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.12 (“A benefit corporation may have an 
officer designated the ‘benefit officer’ ....” (emphasis added)). 
499 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-9(a)–(b). 
500 See id.; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1824(B)(2); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-9; S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 33-38-430(B)(3). 
501 The Maryland statute does not acknowledge or address the issue of officers of 
benefit corporations. 
502 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-789 (2012). One might term this approach the “third-party 
business judgment” standard insofar as its conjunctive language appears to cloak officers’ 
decisions under the veil of the business judgment rule, so long as those decisions are 
consistent with third-party standards. Id. (“An officer of a benefit corporation shall have 
no liability for actions [that] ... are consistent with (i) the general public benefit ... and (ii) 
the requirements of any third-party standard then in effect.”) (emphasis added)). 
503 CAL. CORP. CODE § 14622(a)(1)–(2) (West 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-8(a)–
(b); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.11. 
504 CAL. CORP. CODE § 14622(b) (providing that an officer’s consideration of 
stakeholder interests shall not constitute a violation of the officer’s duties); id. § 14622(c) 
(shielding officers from liability for money damages for any action taken under this section 
or failure to create a general or specific public benefit); id. § 14622(d) (explicitly denying a 
right of action to stakeholders or beneficiaries of the public benefits against officers of 
benefit corporations). 
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The Benefit Enforcement Proceeding. Nine states—California, Louisi-
ana, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 
Virginia, and Vermont—and the District of Columbia provide for a special 
right of action against benefit corporations—namely, a benefit enforcement 
proceeding (BEP).505 A BEP is a limited right of action available to share-
holders, directors, or any other persons that may be specified in the articles of 
incorporation.506 In most cases, standing to bring a BEP is also granted to 
persons or groups who own at least 5%507 of the equity interest in a benefit 
corporation’s parent corporation.508 In most states, BEPs are limited to claims 
against directors or officers for failure to pursue the general or specific public 
benefit purpose of the corporation or violation of a duty or standard of con-
duct.509 California adds “failure of the benefit corporation to deliver or post 
an annual benefit report as required by Section 14630” to this list of pre-
approved BEP claims.510 
The New York and Maryland statutes do not create any special right of 
action against benefit corporations. While these statutes fail to mention BEPs, 
benefit corporations incorporated in these jurisdictions are still subject to the 
provisions of their respective corporate codes.511 Therefore, shareholders have 
standing to bring derivative suits alleging breach of fiduciary duties or vio-
lations of standards of conduct.512 Because directors of benefit corporations 
are under an additional duty to consider stakeholder interests, shareholders 
                                                 
505 CAL. CORP. CODE § 14623; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1825(B); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 14A:18-10(b); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-440(C) (2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, 
§ 21.13(b); S.B. 2897, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2012) (effective Jan. 1, 2013); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 238, § 52.11(a) (2012); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3322(a) (2012). 
506 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-10(b)(2)(a) to (b)(2)(d); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
11A, § 21.13(b)(1)–(4). 
507 Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-10(b)(2)(c), and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, 
§ 21.13(b)(3), with CAL. CORP. CODE § 14623(b)(2)(C), and S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-
440(C)(2)(c). The former require a 10% equity interest in the parent corporation, while 
the latter require only a 5% interest to trigger the right to a BEP. 
508 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-10(b)(2)(c); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.13(b)(3). 
509 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-1; VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782 (2012); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.13(c). 
510 CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(b)(3). Hawaii’s statute is less clear. It does not set forth any 
special right of action against Benefit Corporations, but rather provides in general terms that 
shareholders and directors have the right to bring derivative claims “to enforce corporate 
purposes and the standards for directors ... [and] to enforce the general or specific public 
benefit purposes” of the corporation. HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-10 (2012). Thus, while not 
explicitly providing for a BEP, the Hawaii statute appears to infer the existence of a limited 
right of action available only to directors and shareholders. 
511 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-02 (LexisNexis 2012); N.Y. 
BUS. CORP. LAW § 1701 (McKinney 2012). 
512 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-405.1; N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 720. 
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in states that do not provide for a special right of action vis-à-vis a BEP may 
still pursue a traditional derivative action alleging a violation of that duty.513 
Public Comment. The public comment requirement is unique to the 
Hawaiian statute. Before publishing its final ABR, a Hawaiian “sustainable 
business corporation” is required to “post a draft of its benefit report on the 
public section of its website, or make it otherwise available to the public, for 
a sixty-day public comment period.”514 Directors of benefit corporations are 
required to consider stakeholder interests in business decisions, but only 
those incorporated under the laws of Hawaii are required to include stake-
holders and the general public in the drafting of the ABR. 
Forfeiture of Social Enterprise Corporate Status. The potential forfei-
ture of benefit corporation status is a feature unique to the New Jersey stat-
ute. Benefit corporations registered in New Jersey are required to submit a 
copy of their ABR, along with a $70.00 filing fee, to the Department of the 
Treasury on an annual basis.515 In the event a benefit corporation fails to file 
an ABR for two consecutive years,516 the Department of the Treasury is 
granted the authority to file a statement that the benefit corporation has for-
feited its status and is no longer subject to the act.517 However, the forfeiture 
can be remedied by filing an ABR with the Department of the Treasury, 
triggering automatic reinstatement of benefit corporation status.518 Never-
theless, potential loss of operating power and benefit corporation status pose 
significant deterrents to potential violators. 
F. Conclusion 
The four new entities discussed in this Part constitute the first genera-
tion of entities in the social enterprise revolution in U.S. corporate law. 
They remain, by and large, untested corporate forms with high aspirations 
and varying approaches to finding an effective blend of corporate purpos-
es. The success of the L3C may depend in large part on the effectiveness 
of the recently proposed IRS regulations to allay tax risks with respect to 
PRIs. The FPC offers the interesting option of serving either charitable or 
                                                 
513 Clark & Babson, supra note 14, at 850 (emphasizing that while BEPs grant sharehold-
ers an expanded right of action, the duty to consider stakeholder interests does not require 
a particular outcome of the directors’ decision-making). 
514 HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-11(b). Note, however, that the Hawaiian “sustainable 
business corporation,” while bearing a different name than the benefit corporation, appears to 
be a distinction without a difference as the statute mirrors other benefit corporation statutes. 
515 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11(d)(1) (West 2012). 
516 Id. § 14A:18-11(d)(2). 
517 Id. 
518 Id. 
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blended-value purposes, but vague drafting and unprecedented grants of 
limited liability may risk doing more harm than good to the social enter-
prise movement. The SPC, with its introduction of the anti-Revlon declara-
tion, is a significant step away from shareholder wealth maximization. How-
ever, the lack of third-party standards for reporting requirements remains a 
legitimate accountability concern for the SPC form. Finally, there is the bene-
fit corporation. It offers the most specific list of public benefits and a catch-
all provision enabling entrepreneurs to pursue a limitless number of specific 
social and environmental benefits, while still requiring the overall pursuit 
of a general public benefit. Benefit directors and other officers enjoy lim-
ited liability, but they are under a duty to consider stakeholder interests 
when making business decisions, which is made enforceable through the 
BEP. All ABRs must meet minimum content requirements and must be as-
sessed against independent, third-party standards measuring social and en-
vironmental performance. 
In light of the above analysis, the benefit corporation emerges as the 
most promising corporate entity. On paper, it appears to combine an appro-
priate mixture of specifically defined social or environment corporate pur-
poses, transparency, accountability, flexibility, and limited liability for so-
cial entrepreneurs.519 This might explain why, on the morning of January 3, 
2012, several CEOs, including Yvon Chouinard of Patagonia,520 lined up out-
side the Secretary of State’s office to file their reincorporation papers and be-
come benefit corporations.521 The next Part will first address some critiques 
                                                 
519 See Clark & Babson, supra note 14, at 851 (concluding that the benefit corporation 
“is the most comprehensive, yet flexible legal entity devised to address the needs of 
entrepreneurs and investors, and ultimately, the general public”). 
520 Marc Lifsher, Firms File for Do-Good Status, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2012, at B1, B4. 
Yvon Chouinard explained: “Benefit corporation legislation creates the legal framework to 
enable mission-driven companies like Patagonia to stay mission-driven through succession, 
capital raises and even changes in ownership by institutionalizing the values, culture, 
processes and high standards put in place by founding entrepreneurs.” Id. at B4. Patagonia, 
already well known for its environmental commitments, was the first major company to 
adopt the benefit corporation form in California. Firms with Benefits: A New Sort of 
Caring, Sharing Company Gathers Momentum, ECONOMIST (Jan. 7, 2012), http://www
.economist.com/node/21542432. Following Patagonia, Sun Light & Power and King Arthur 
Flour became benefit corporations, demonstrating the entity’s adoption across industry 
lines. See About Us, SUN LIGHT & POWER, http://sunlightandpower.com/about/#136 (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2013); see also About: Social Responsibility, KING ARTHUR FLOUR, http://
www.kingarthurflour.com/about/social-responsibility.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
521 Lifsher, supra note 522, at B1; see also Alex Goldmark, Twelve California 
Companies Seize the Moment to Become Benefit Corporations, GOOD (Jan. 3, 2012, 12:00 
PM), http://www.good.is/post/eighteen-california-companies-seize-the-moment-to-become
-benefit-corporations/. 
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of the benefit corporation, and then make the case for the benefit corporation 
as the most appropriate vehicle for the social enterprise movement. 
IV. THE CASE FOR THE BENEFIT CORPORATION 
A. Responding to the “Social Business” Critique 
Perhaps the most outspoken critic of blended value approaches to social 
enterprise is, surprisingly, Muhammad Yunus, the father of the microcredit 
industry. Yunus became a Nobel Peace Prize laureate in 2006 for his work 
advancing a “social business” model aimed at alleviating poverty.522 He 
goes to great lengths to distinguish his term “social business” as a specific 
subset of the broader social enterprise movement.523 
Yunus presents three arguments against the blended value approaches 
gaining momentum in the U.K. and the United States. First, Yunus makes a 
moral argument, contending that it is inherently immoral to make a profit 
from the poor, and that this constitutes “benefiting from the suffering of our 
fellow human beings.”524 Yunus uses examples from his experience in the 
microcredit arena525 and, admittedly, within the confines of this limited con-
text, his moral argument is very strong. 
However, the argument fails to hold water when applied to social enter-
prises engaging in other social or environmental goals. Take, for example, 
Solar Works, a California benefit corporation that provides full-service solar 
panel design and installation.526 Alternatively, consider Clay.com, a New 
York benefit corporation that provides a social marketplace of second-hand 
items that raises money for local communities.527 Neither of these benefit 
corporations directly addresses poverty, but both still strive to achieve spe-
cific environmental or social benefits in their respective communities. These 
examples show how Yunus’s definition of social business narrows its focus 
to traditionally charitable issues—namely, poverty—and reflects how social 
business is much more akin to European social cooperatives than American 
social enterprise entities. 
                                                 
522 The Nobel Peace Prize 2006, NOBELPRIZE.ORG (Oct. 13, 2006), http://www.nobel
prize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/press.html. 
523 YUNUS, supra note 2, at 12 (emphasizing that social business is a “new category” 
of business). 
524 Id. at 13. 
525 Id. at 13–14. 
526 See SOLARWORKS, http://www.solarworksca.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
527 CLAY, http://www.clay.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
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Yunus also contends that “[i]n times of stress, profit will always trump 
the other ‘bottom lines.’”528 He argues that blended-value approaches create 
confusion for board members over how to balance those goals,529 and that 
where confusion arises, profits will almost always win over social goals, 
which will “fade in importance.”530 In contrast, he explains that there is no 
balancing of contradictory objectives involved in a social business because 
every business decision is measured by whether it will enable the business 
“to provide the greatest possible benefit to society,”531 and in this sense it is 
guided by its primarily charitable purpose. 
Instead of avoiding tension between profit and purpose, most emerging 
entities invite this conflict with open arms and attempt to insulate those mak-
ing holistic business decisions from personal liability.532 This is a much dif-
ferent approach to Yunus’s social business model, but the fact that these enti-
ties require consideration of non-shareholder interests is a significant step 
away from the single bottom-line, shareholder-centric model of corporate 
governance. Furthermore, Yunus’s argument overlooks the possibility that 
certain entities, like benefit corporations, permit the founders to enshrine the 
primacy of one or more stakeholder interests above others, thus giving direc-
tors a more tangible yardstick by which to measure their decisions. 
Lastly, Yunus makes a systemic argument, contending that social busi-
ness is necessary to create “a clearly defined alternative ... in order to 
change mindsets, reshape economic structures, and encourage new forms of 
thinking.”533 This argument is compelling,534 but the momentous economic 
restructuring it envisions will not occur overnight. It may be that the even-
tual success of Yunus’s social business model is necessarily dependent on 
the organic development of smaller, incremental shifts towards stakeholder-
inclusive governance models. The imposition of an enforceable duty to con-
sider stakeholder interests, for example, represents a significant step in this 
direction. In this sense, blended value entities like the benefit corporation 
may represent stepping stones to Yunus’s social business.535 
                                                 
528 YUNUS, supra note 2, at 14 (arguing that in practice, CEOs tend to “lean—perhaps 
unconsciously—in favor of profit, and exaggerate the social benefits being created”). 
529 Id. (“The idea of a ‘mixed’ company offers no clear guidance ....”). 
530 Id. 
531 Id. at 15. 
532 Clark & Babson, supra note 14, at 840–41, 848–49. 
533 YUNUS, supra note 2, at 16. 
534 Id. (“Social business is about totally delinking from the old framework of 
business—not accommodating new objectives within the existing framework.”). 
535 Id. at 1. (“[Type I social business] is a non-loss, non-dividend company devoted to 
solving a social problem and owned by investors who reinvest all profits in expanding and 
improving the business.”). 
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B. The Valuation Problem 
Some commentators highlight the problem of valuing a corporation’s so-
cial and environmental impacts, observing that a failure to agree upon metrics 
for such impacts stifles the growth of investments in social enterprise.536 The-
se critiques continue to be made despite the fact that several organizations, in 
addition to B Labs, infra, have promulgated assessment tools.537 For exam-
ple: the Center for Sustainable Organization’s (CSO) Social Footprint,538 the 
Roberts Enterprise Development Fund’s Ongoing Assessment of Social Im-
pactS (OASIS);539 New Profit, Inc.’s Balance Scorecard;540 the Social Return 
On Investment (SROI);541 the ISO2600;542 and, most prominently, the Global 
Reporting Initiative’s (GRI) G3 Guidelines.543 
This is an area in which the failures of CR reporting can creep into the 
new ground being broken by social enterprise entities. CSI’s Social Footprint 
is one of the few assessment tools that attempts to provide a mathematical 
calculation of “anthro capital” to generate a value representing a social bot-
tom line.544 This is a promising development, but by no means a silver bullet. 
The reality is that the financial industry possesses myriad tools for measuring 
a company’s financial value, but has only begun to explore different methods 
for valuing a corporation’s social and environmental impacts and benefits. 
Social enterprise’s biggest challenge will be to fashion new and innovative 
metrics for measuring social and environmental benefits.545 
                                                 
536 Snyder, supra note 103, at 586 (“There have been recent efforts to quantify social 
impact. Examination of such efforts affirms initial intuitions and illustrates that given the 
nature of the issues, the reports are inherently ambiguous.”). 
537 See generally List of Standards, BENEFIT CORP INFO. CENTER, http://benefitcorp.
net/selecting-a-third-party-standard/list-of-standards (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
538 The Social Footprint Method, CENTER FOR SUSTAINABLE ORGS., http://www.sust
ainableorganizations.org/the-social-footprint.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2013); see also 
Snyder, supra note 103, at 586. 
539 See generally Fay Twersky & BTW Consultants, An Information OASIS: The Design 
and Implementation of Comprehensive and Customized Client Information and Tracking 
Systems, REDF (2002), http://www.redf.org/learn-from-redf/publications/121. 
540 Rob Wherry, The Matchmaker, FORBES, Dec. 23, 2002, http://www.forbes.com/forbes
/2002/1223/338_print.html (“The key to New Profit is its scorecard, which rates a nonprofit 
on a series of financial and other sorts of benchmarks.”). 
541 See The SROI Guide, THE SROI NETWORK, http://www.thesroinetwork.org/sroi-anal
ysis/the-sroi-guide (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
542 See ISO 26000—Social Responsibility, ISO (2010), http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_cat
alogue/management_and_leadership_standards/social_responsibility/iso26000. 
543 See G3 Guidelines, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, https://www.globalreporting.org
/reporting/latest-guidelines/g3-guidelines/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2013); see 
also Snyder, supra note 103, at 586–91 (providing an overview of the GRI G3 Guidelines). 
544 The Social Footprint Method, supra note 538; see also Snyder, supra note 103, at 592. 
545 See Doeringer, supra note 254, at 323 (suggesting increasing investments in research and 
development of valuation metrics that accurately account for the impact of social enterprise). 
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C. Benefit Corporations Going Forward 
This Article has argued that, in comparison to the other emerging cor-
porate entities currently available to social entrepreneurs, the benefit corpo-
ration most effectively blends profit with social and environmental goals, 
and accountability with flexibility. But the benefit corporation’s strongest 
competition going forward may not be the new entities discussed above, 
but rather546 the already popular and notoriously flexible limited liability 
company (LLC).547 Proponents of the LLC, like Anne E. Conaway, argue 
that the LLC can better accommodate the blended-value goals that benefit 
corporations seek to achieve.548 They contend that the benefit corporation 
imposes additional costs in comparison to LLCs.549 For example, in states 
that require independent benefit directors to sit on the board, the benefit 
corporation is obliged to search for and pay a salary to that individual.550 
Additionally, LLC proponents emphasize that benefit corporation statutes 
muddy the waters of fiduciary duties, and that a carefully tailored LLC 
agreement can more specifically delineate directors’ fiduciary duties to an 
organization and its members.551 Lastly, the LLC generally qualifies as a 
“pass through” entity for federal income tax purposes, whereas the benefit 
corporation offers no relief from the traditional corporate entity tax.552 
These are perhaps the most compelling arguments against the benefit 
corporation, and addressing them substantively should be the polestar for 
future drafting and policy decisions. The following offers some suggestions 
in the hopes of sparking a conversation about the future of the benefit cor-
poration and its role in the social enterprise movement. 
1. Statutory Reform 
There are several areas in which state legislatures can improve upon the 
first generation of statutes currently on the books. Lawmakers can require 
                                                 
546 Thomas Earl Geu, Understanding the Limited Liability Company: A Basic Comparative 
Primer (Part One), 37 S.D. L. REV. 44, 45 (1991) (“[The LLC] is a hybrid form of business 
created by combining the organizational and tax attributes of partnerships and corporations 
....” (emphasis added)). 
547 Anne E. Conaway, The Global Use of the Delaware Limited Liability Company for 
Socially-Driven Purposes, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 772, 780 (2012) (“The thesis of this 
article is that, presently, the Delaware LLC provides global investors maximum internal 
efficiency, as well as asset protection at a decreased agency cost, for businesses operating 
solely within or outside the United States for socially-driven purposes.”). 
548 Id. at 801. 
549 Reiser, supra note 17, at 608. 
550 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-7 (West 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.10 (2012). 
551 See Conaway, supra note 547, at 801–02, 816. 
552 See Geu, supra note 546, at 45. 
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that the independent, third-party reporting standard produce some metric 
for measuring an organization’s social and environmental impacts. Permit-
ting benefit corporations to select third-party standards such as the GRI 
Guidelines or other standards that lack qualitative methodology does noth-
ing more than require what 95% of the world’s largest corporations already 
engage in—public relations moonlighting as corporate social responsibil-
ity. If states are willing to hand over the enforcement reins to third-party 
standard setters, they should at minimum require that those standards use 
some objective calculus to give numerical values to a benefit corporation’s 
social and environmental benefits. Doing so would produce two results for 
benefit corporations: first, it would effectively address methodological short-
comings of CR reporting; second, it would prevent a race to the bottom 
amongst third-party standard setters. Most important, it would encourage 
the creation of new valuation metrics and force those already engaged in 
standard setting to pursue more robust methodologies. Once acceptable 
methodologies are in place, lawmakers might set minimum requirements 
for social and environmental performance that benefit corporations must 
meet in order to maintain their corporate status. 
To the extent that lawmakers are uncomfortable with turning over the 
lion’s share of regulatory authority to independent third parties, they might 
also consider adopting a public participation provision like that in the Ha-
waiian statute. Costs associated with permitting public comment are mar-
ginal, and yet this simple step opens a dialogue between communities served 
by benefit corporations, and it may strengthen ties with stakeholder groups 
whose interests benefit corporations are under a duty to consider. While re-
quiring a period for public comment may provide another layer of enforce-
ment, the effectiveness of this approach relies on the ABR being assessed 
against objective third-party standards in the first place. 
New Jersey’s forfeiture of social enterprise status provision553 offers 
additional regulation of the ABR. However, this approach requires a greater 
degree of government oversight and involvement than other benefit corpo-
ration statutes that leave enforcement to the shareholders by way of the 
BEP.554 Theoretically, the threat of derivative suits for failure to prepare an 
ABR is sufficient to ensure that such reports are distributed and made public. 
However, to prevent unscrupulous business practices that seek to use the 
good will of the benefit corporation brand to defraud consumers, a simple 
forfeiture of status provision may provide a necessary regulatory floor. 
The author suggests that future benefit corporation statutes adopt an el-
ement of the SPC statute—namely, the anti-Revlon “mission statement” 
                                                 
553 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11(d)(1). 
554 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782 (2012). 
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providing: “The mission of this social purpose corporation is not necessarily 
compatible with and may be contrary to maximizing profits and earnings 
for shareholders, or maximizing shareholder value in any sale, merger, ac-
quisition, or other similar actions of the corporation,” to supplement the 
benefit corporation’s purpose of “creating a general public benefit,” and to 
make clear that—in all business decisions—directors are free to choose not 
to maximize profits. 
Finally, some commentators have suggested that requiring only one bene-
fit director on the board is insufficient, particularly in larger organizations.555 
Steven Munch suggests that future legislation “require benefit corporations 
to enlist additional benefit directors as they grow and, once they reach a cer-
tain size, to organize full benefit committees as part of their boards.”556 
2. Tax Credits 
Another method to foster the growth of benefit corporations, and social 
enterprise in general, is to provide tax credits for these organizations. As 
several commentators have pointed out, benefit corporations and other so-
cial enterprise entities receive no preferential tax treatment,557 and they ar-
gue that tax credits offer a practical counterweight to the added burden 
borne by the entities’ commitment to socially and environmental responsi-
ble business practices.558 Because benefit corporation directors are given the 
discretion to de-prioritize shareholder wealth maximization, they may very 
well reap a lower return on investment.559 Tax credits could prove especial-
ly helpful for start-ups seeking seed-stage funding. 
Some local jurisdictions have already enacted such tax credits. The city of 
Philadelphia recently introduced a Sustainable Business Tax Credit, effective 
through 2017.560 Certified B Corporations located in Philadelphia are eligible 
                                                 
555 Munch, supra note 78, at 193. 
556 Id. 
557 See, e.g., Ajulo Othow, Benefits Corporations: A New Way to Balance Values and 
Profits, RAPPAPORT BRIEFING (Sept. 8, 2012), http://rappaportbriefing.net/2012/09/08/bene
fits-corporations-a-new-way-to-balance-values-and-profits/ (“Benefits [sic] corporations also 
differ from non-profit organizations whose operators and donors rely on significant tax 
advantages to encourage giving to fund their programs. Benefits corporations have no such 
tax advantages; they must instead maintain a viable for-profit model to stay in business.”). 
558 See Munch, supra note 78, at 188 (noting that this approach has caused mixed 
reactions in the United States). 
559 See id. 
560 City of Philadelphia Bus. Servs., Credits, Grants, & Other Incentives, CITY OF 
PHILADELPHIA, https://business.phila.gov/pages/taxcreditsotherincentives.aspx (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2013). There have also been rumors that Portland, Oregon, and Washington, D.C., 
will grant tax breaks to certified B Corporations; see also Gupta, supra note 366, at 225. 
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to be classified as sustainable businesses and receive a tax credit of $4000.561 
Other government incentives for benefit corporations are also being proposed. 
For example, in San Francisco, Bill No. 120082 would amend the San Fran-
cisco Administrative Code to give California benefit corporations additional 
points in the system the city uses for bidding contracts.562 While prospects of 
federal tax relief for benefit corporations remain uncertain, state and local 
governments can take steps to foster social enterprise in their areas by adopt-
ing tax credits or preferred government contract status. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has illustrated the effects of the global social enterprise 
movement on corporate law in Europe and the United States. In doing so, 
the Article has drawn a stark contrast between the European and American 
approaches, and it has emphasized that the emerging entities associated 
with these approaches lie along a surprisingly broad spectrum, from social 
cooperatives that operate like traditional charities to for-profit FPC’s with 
unprecedented protection for directors and their business judgment. The 
Article argues that the benefit corporation is the most promising entity for 
social entrepreneurs. While benefit corporations may be the most desirable 
of this first generation of social enterprises, whether they provide suffi-
cient benefits to overcome the strong preference for LLCs remains debata-
ble. Likewise, the uncertainty surrounding the ability of third-party stan-
dards to prevent selective reporting and foster accurate valuation metrics 
for social and environmental performance continues to impede progress. 
Despite these problems, one cannot overlook the consistent growth in 
investments in social enterprise. Increased financial support and the con-
tinued experimentation with a growing list of entities designed specifically 
for social entrepreneurs are necessary for continued progress. Indeed, these 
trends should give social entrepreneurs reason to hope for a future that in-
cludes a thriving economic sector offering accurate valuation metrics and 
efficient corporate entities that allow business to be used as a tool for so-
cial and environmental good. 
                                                 
561 City of Philadelphia Business Services, supra note 560. However, no more than 
twenty-five sustainable businesses may receive the tax credit in any one tax year. Id. 
562 Mark Hrywna, Benefit Corporations in California Meets Chill in San Francisco, 
NONPROFIT TIMES (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.thenonprofittimes.com/article/detail/ben
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